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YET ANOTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS?
KErrH E. WHIT GTON*
ABSTRACT
The recent presidential impeachment and the postelection
controversy each led many to fear that the United States had either
already entered or was about to enter a constitutional crisis. Such
concerns seem overwrought. This Article will use those events as a
foil for examining the nature of constitutional crises. The Article
will distinguish two types of constitutional crises and consider
several potential crises in American history, clarifying how crises
occur and how they can be averted. Constitutional crises in the
United States are rare in large part because of the robustness of the
country's informal constitutional practices, reasonably good
constitutional design, and relatively limited political disagreement.
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This is no social crisis. Just another tricky day for you.
Pete Townshend'
Like local television newsmen who are quick to declare the latest
rain shower to be a weather emergency, many have recently found
that the words "constitutional crisis" come readily to their lips.
During the height of the impeachment efforts directed against
President Bill Clinton, there were over a thousand references in the
media to a constitutional crisis in the United States.2 Perhaps
building on that momentum, there were nearly twice as many
references to an American constitutional crisis during the legal
disputes following the 2000 presidential election.3 Similarly, com-
mentators readily perceived in both events the collapse of political
order and a system in chaos.4 Even for many of those who did not
believe that a constitutional crisis was already upon us in the midst
of these events, they saw one looming on the horizon.
Perhaps, now that a little time has passed, the excess of such
reactions to these recent events is already evident. Even at the time,
the general public seemed to have demonstrated substantially
greater patience and calm-and perhaps simple disinterest-than
1. THE WHO, Another Tricky Day, on FACE DANCES (Warner Brothers 1981).
2. I found 1026 sources making such references. Dow Jones Interactive, Publications
Library, All Publications Database, at httpj/www.dowjones.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2001)
(search for records containing "constitutional crisis" and "impeachment" between the dates
of September 1, 1998 and February 28, 1999).
3. I found 1901 sources making such references. Dow Jones Interactive, Publications
Library, All Publications Database, at http:J/www.dowjones.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2001)
(search for records containing "constitutional crisis" and "Gore" between the dates of
November 6, 2000 and December 15, 2000). Such numbers are only illustrative of the
significance of the perception of a possible constitutional crisis in the United States. It should
be noted that while possibly missing some similar references, such a basic search also
captures instances in which multiple news organizations report a common source using the
term, such as when Chief Justice Charles Wells of the Florida Supreme Court prominently
warned of a constitutional crisis in his dissenting opinion in Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,
1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In addition,
such a search does not distinguish the tone of reference, as when an article denies the
existence of a constitutional crisis.
4. I found 755 sources making suchreferences duringthe impeachment and 1980 sources
making such references after the election. Dow Jones Interactive, Publications Library, All
Publications Database, at http'/www.dowjones.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) (search for
records containing "chaos" and "impeachment" between the dates of September 1, 1998 and
February 28, 1999, and "chaos" and "Gore" between November 6, 2000 and December 15,
2000).
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the political class directly engaged in the struggle.' The republic
appears to have survived these events relatively unscathed. Still-
fresh events abroad also put our own cries of constitutional crisis in
sharp relief. Our "crises" appear rather mild compared to, for
example, President Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to concede defeat
in the Yugoslavian elections, President Vladimir Putin's crackdown
on independent regional governors and media critics in Russia,
President Alberto Fujimori's arrest of congressional leaders in Peru,
or President Boris Yeltsin's armed conflict with the Russian
Parliament. Perhaps such examples would suggest the need for a bit
of morning-after sheepishness about our reaction to our own
political upheavals. More fundamentally and more usefully,
however, they may also suggest the need to consider consti-
tutionalism and the workings of our constitutional system a bit
more closely.
In particular, it would be useful to identify the features of a
constitutional crisis. Doing so would help advance our under-
standing of constitutionalism generally and of American consti-
tutionalism particularly. Although the possibility of crisis shows the
constitutional system in extremis, it may also illuminate the more
routine ways in which the constitutional system is preserved. The
consideration of constitutional crises also suggests that such crises
have been extraordinarily rare in the United States, especially at
the national level. There seem to be two conflicting popular
narratives regarding such matters. Most of the time, we seem to
accept a narrative of constitutional stability with a single
constitutional order extending seamlessly from the Founding period
to the present.6 At the same time, the popular media, at least, seems
prone to revert to a narrative of constitutional crisis when politics
drifts outside the routine.7 In such moments, we seem quick to
question the vitality of the American constitutional machinery and
5. In public opinion polls conducted in November and December of 2000, no more than
seventeen percent of respondents, and often substantially fewer, thought the election fracas
amounted to a "constitutional crisis." See poll results collected by Karlyn H. Bowman, The
2000 Election: What the Polls Said (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.aei.org/ps/psbowman6.pdf.
6. A version of this narrative is appropriately critiqued in 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40-44 (1991).
7. E.g., supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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uncomfortable with relying on its less familiar mechanisms. Given
the historical durability of the U.S. Constitution and the relatively
minor character of recent events, such doubts seem unwarranted.
An excessive fear of the fragility of the constitutional system can be
as damaging as a heedless assumption that the Constitution will
always save us from ourselves. Distinguishing between false and
genuine constitutional crises, and recognizing the causes of the
latter, will perhaps help us steer a middle course.
Though many seem to think that they know one when they see
one, the notion of a constitutional crisis is ill-defined. A primary
goal of this Article is to give the concept somewhat better definition.
The first section of the Article distinguishes two types of
constitutional crises, briefly illustrates them, and places the Clinton
impeachment and the 2000 presidential election controversy in
context. The second section considers several prominent candidates
for crisis status from American history. This section argues that
most of these events should not be regarded as constitutional crises,
but, more importantly, it helps clarify how crises can occur and how
they can be averted. The final section considers the significance of
these events to our understanding of constitutional crises and the
relative success of the American constitutional experiment.
I. Two TYPES OF CONSTrTUTIONAL CRISES
Overviewing the concept of a crisis, one political scholar
concluded, "[c]risis' is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning."'
The varied use of the term denudes it of any real analytical value.
There are relatively few efforts to specify the concept of a crisis.
They are more often taken as "first-order realities," "givens of
history" that "do not call for particular identification or definition.
'Everybody' knows when one happens."9 Perhaps especially in the
context of international affairs, there is an apparently "natural
8. James A. Robinson, Crisis, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 510 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). The situation has hardly improved over time. The
latest effort to create a comprehensive encyclopedia of the social sciences does not even
include an entry for the term "crisis." See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (N.J. Smelser & P.B. Bates eds., 2001).
9. Charles A. McClelland, The Acute International Crisis, 14 WORLD POL. 182, 183
(1961).
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naming" of such events as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Iran
Hostage Crisis that belies the need for theoretical inquiry.0 Crisis
often implies or is used synonymously with "panic, catastrophe,
disaster, [or] violence.""
Crises can be defined in different ways. Consistent with the
etymological origins of the term and contemporary medical usage,
a crisis can be identified with a turning point or decisive moment.'2
In the social arena, however, crises are not necessarily decisive and
have a more negative connotation. Crises can also be understood as
situations requiring decision or action and involving instability or
threats to important values. 3 As a consequence, "crisis confronts
decision makers with potential consequences of profound impor-
tance," but also with substantial uncertainty and time pressures.'4
Although the outcome of a crisis may be favorable or result in little
alteration of the status quo ante, such crises have a negative
connotation because they put important values under stress. Crises
represent a disruption of the existing equilibrium, a breakdown of
order.'" For example, a period of crisis may be a moment in which
"old economic, political, and ideological arrangements are in decline,
and alternative institutional arrangements exist only in inchoate
10. Id.
11. Robinson, supra note 8, at 510.
12. IVTHE OXFORD ENGLISHDIcTIONARY 27 (2d. ed. 1989); Robinson, supra note 8, at 510.
13. See MEPyRAm-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (10th ed. 1993); McClelland,
supra note 9, at 189; Robinson, supra note 8, at 510-12.
14. Robinson, supra note 8, at 511-13. As Robinson notes, it is not simply the importance
of the decision that creates a crisis, but also such considerations as how much control actors
have over events. Id. at 510-13. This implies, for example, that crises can be asymmetrical.
See id. The Iran Hostage Crisis, for example, was more likely to be experienced as a "crisis7
in the United States than in Iran.
15. The concept of crisis has been similarly developed within Marxist critical theory.
Claus Offe, for example, defines crises "as processes in which the structure of the system is
called into question... [that] endanger the identity of the system." These may result either
from events that "lie'outside' the boundaries determined by the system" and thus are "foreign
to ... or destructive of that system," or from internally generated events "that violate the
'grammar' of social processes." CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 36-37
(1984). Similarly, Jurgen Habermas has developed the concept of crisis as arising "when the
structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary
to the continued existence of the system. In this sense, crises are seen as persistent
disturbances of system integration." JURGEN IABERAS, LEGMATION CRISIS 2 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
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form," ' or when a period of international peace is disrupted by a
moment of heightened conflict,1' or when economic stability
suddenly gives way to deep depression"' or uncontrolled inflation. 9
How might these cQncepts be applied to the notion of a consti-
tutional crisis? The possibility of natural naming would seem to be
unrealized in a constitutional context, since there appears to be no
agreed-upon or enduring list of such events and there is an absence
of historical events bearing the explicit name of crisis in American
constitutional history, in contrast to American economic or political
history. The modifier constitutional introduces its own ambiguities.
An international crisis, for example, reflects a crisis within the
international arena and a disruption of the international order,
which suggests that crises become particularly constitutional
when they threaten the constitutional roots of a political system.
A political crisis becomes a constitutional crisis when not just a
particular administration is put at risk, but the constitutional
system itself is tested.2" The concept of a crisis government is sug-
gestive, and represents the interruption and temporary replacement
of constitutional government by executive or military rule when
constitutional governance becomes impossible.2" To the extent that
constitutional crisis is used to mean more than a particularly
16. Kriss A. Drass & Edgar Kiser, Structural Roots of Visions of the Future: World-System
Crisis and Stability and the Production of Utopian Literature in the United States: 1883-1975,
32 INTL STUD. Q. 421,423 (1988).
17. See McClelland, supra note 9, at 183.
18. Clearly the immediate subjective experience of those living through a political event
is an inadequate guide to defining a constitutional crisis. Such contemporary feelings of crisis
do not generally seem, in a constitutional context, to survive the test of time. The
contemporary subjective sense of a constitutional crisis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for identifying an actual constitutional crisis. See also HABERMAS, supra note 15, at
4 ("[A] contemporary consciousness of crisis often turns out afterwards to have been
misleading. A society does not plunge into crisis when, and onlywhen, its members so identify
the situation.").
19. Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN OF
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 1, 54 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978).
20. Similarly a regime crisis results when the political system itself (or successive
governments) seems incapable of responding to a problem, not simply when a particular
government or administration fails. Id. at 50.
21. E.g., JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF
LAW, 15-22 (1991); Karl Dietrich Bracher, Crisis Government, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 8, at 514; Linz, supra note 19, at 54.
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emphatic sense of political trouble, the term seems to be used to
signal the threat of a breakdown in the constitutional order.22
Constitutional crises arise out of the failure, or strong risk of
failure, of a constitution to perform its central functions.2' This
formulation is deceptively simple and, as we shall see, a number of
more specific circumstances can fit within this broader framework.
Although the particular functions of a constitution can be described
in a variety of ways, constitutions are importantly concerned
with establishing a government and with enshrining foundational
political values.' For liberal constitutions, enshrining foundational
political values will largely entail identifying the proper limits of
government power, and the institutions of government will be
designed with an eye toward making those limits politically
effective.25 A constitution is thrown into crisis when its prescrip-
tive structure cannot be realized in practice or is significantly
22. There appears to be some ambiguity in usage as to when such a crisis actually occurs.
Unlike other sorts of crises, the term constitutional crisis does not appear to recognize a
distinct time boundary. Cf McClelland, supra note 9, at 189 (defining an international crisis
as "mark[ing] the time of a turning point in a conflict and a period when major decisions are
likely to be made"). It is not always clear whether the mere threat of a breakdown in the
constitutional order is sufficient to give rise to a "constitutional crisis," or whether the crisis
itself can "threaten" or be "risked" but only emerges when the constitutional order actually
does break down.
23. Stephen Griffin defines a constitutional crisis somewhat similarly, but he goes on to
suggest that "[tihe designation of constitutional crisis may be appropriate also in situations
when the apparentlynormal operationof the constitutional systemproduces a continual sense
ofpolitical uncertainty and unease." STEPHENM. GRIFFIN, AMmEIcAN CONsTITUTIONALSM 194
(1996). I do not believe that this extension is appropriate. Griffin adds this extension, in part,
to account for those situations in which "there are indications that something is
fundamentally wrong" but "matters do not necessarily reach a decisive moment." Id. Simple
"unease" is at most the precursor to crisis, however, not a crisis itself. As Griffin's own
analysis (of the "story of the constitutional system since the New Deal") suggests, political
uncertainty and unease may persist for decades, even as the constitutional order continues
to function. I& at 194-201. Certainly, it does not seem to be an essential function of
constitutions to eliminate political worry, and thus it cannot be regarded as a failure if
political unease exists within a constitutional order.
24. As defined here, there can be a category of nonliberal constitutions. Although the
semantics of nonliberal constitutionalism can be argued, it seems descriptively useful to
recognize that nonliberal states may also be governed by constitutions that seek to maximize
the consistency between government actions and the fundamental values of the particular (in
this case, nonliberal) regime. Cf Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary
Discussion, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 853, 855-59 (1962).
25. JOHN RAWLS, POLrICAL LIBERALISM 408-09 (1993).
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inadequate to achieving its goals The imagined constitutional
order may no longer be consistent with and unable to contain the
politics on the ground."
Constitutional crises are, in the first instance, crises for and of
the constitution itself. Given the importance of constitutions, a
constitutional crisis is likely to be both a symptom and a cause
of political crisis, but it is worth recognizing that the two are
distinct. Political crises need not implicate the constitution, and
constitutional crises need not have dramatic consequences for
the political system or society broadly. Some failures in the
constitutional machinery may have little or no significance for the
daily lives of most Americans, or even for the routine business of
most government officials. Constitutional crises, for example, need
not become regime crises, threatening the conversion from a
democratic regime to an authoritarian regime. Likewise, consti-
tutional crises need not, from an external perspective, be regarded
as normatively problematic. In some cases a constitutional crisis
may even be regarded as a positive good, if the constitution in
question leads to outcomes that are deeply unjust. This is, after all,
the Madisonian defense of the Federalist subversion of the Articles
of Confederation, which were seen as inadequate to securing justice
and domestic tranquility.'
We can speak of two different types of constitutional crises:
operational crises and crises of fidelity. These two types of con-
stitutional crises arise from different causes, are likely to follow
quite different courses, and require distinct solutions. It should be
recognized, however, that difficulties of one sort may lead to
difficulties of the other, and the most severe crises are likely to
involve difficulties of both sorts.
26. Id. at 353-54.
27. On this theme see generally WILLIAM F. HARRIS H, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTrrUTIOu
46-83 (1993).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison); see also FINN, supra note 21, at 40-44.
2100 [Vol. 43:2093
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A. Crises of Constitutional Operation
Operational crises arise when important political disputes cannot
be resolved within the existing constitutional framework. 9 An
essential element of establishing a well-functioning government is
the identification of procedures for making political decisions and
resolving political disputes. A political system must assume the
existence of disagreement about what substantive actions society
must take; otherwise, there would be no need for politics at all.
Political action must be taken in the presence of disagreement, and
constitutions specify the procedures by which persistent dis-
agreement is overcome and a political decision is made."0 As a result
of unforeseen circumstances or a simple design flaw, a constitution
may fail to establish an authoritative mechanism for ending a
political conflict.
Operational crises may be of two sorts, either formal or practical.
A formal operational crisis arises when following all of the correct
29. The operational crisis category seems to encompass all three types of constitutional
crises suggested by Robert Lipkin: failure to resolve political conflict, contradictory
constitutional provisions, and constitutional indeterminacies. ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALREVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISMAND THE ROLE OFJUDICIALREVIEWINAMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 207 (2000). Lipkin seems to regard these all as types of constitutional
crises because they involve the breakdown of the constitutional machinery and the inability
to move forward politically without "revolutionary adjudication" that steps outside the bounds
of the existing constitution. Id. For my purposes, however, Lipkin casts his net too widely. To
the extent that existing political actors, such as the judiciary, can resolve apparent textual
contradictions or indeterminacies without appeal to extraordinary measures, then they need
not lead to constitutional crises. As I have elaborated elsewhere, I regard such constitutional
constructions as necessary within any constitutional system and not a sign of constitutional
failure. KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3-15 (1999); KEITH E.
WHITIINGTON, CONSTrurUIONAL INTERPRETATION 5-15, 204-12 (1999). Constitutional
indeterminacies do raise the possibility, however, that multiple actors may disagree as to how
best to resolve the indeterminacy. Interpretive disagreement may lead to paralysis. A
constitution could attempt to eliminate any indeterminacies, but in practice there will always
be a need for constitutional interpretation, and therefore the potential for interpretive
disagreement. One solution to this danger is the specification of an ultimate interpreter.
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). This is not the only possible solution, however. Neal Devins &
Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (arguing
that the judiciary shares constitutional interpretation with other political institutions and
society at large).
30. One possibility is, of course, that disagreement over substantive policy may leave the
status quo in place. This formal option maynot always be a practically viable option, however.
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constitutional procedures leads to multiple conflicting endpoints
rather than to a single determinate outcome. 1 At least in that
circumstance, the Constitution produces disorder rather than order.
If there is an election, it should be possible to determine who won
and for a government to be formed. If there is a claim that an
activity has been legally regulated, it should be possible to
determine what is the law. If there is a claim that a government has
authority over some place or persons, it should be possible to
determine who is in charge. Constitutional crises occur when
constitutions fail to provide adequate procedures for making such
determinations. A practical operational crisis occurs when the
constitutional government is incapable of rendering the political
decisions or taking the effective political actions that are widely
regarded as necessary at a given moment.3 2 Constitutions are
intended to create effective, though limited, governments. Certainly
no constitution is intended to be a suicide pact. 33 More generally, to
sustain themselves governments must be capable of responding to
the intense desires of important constituencies. Political crises
will extend to a constitution itself if apparent constitutional
imperfections in structure or law are thought to be responsible for
31. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. RFv. 757,769 (2001) ("Here
the law provides no clear answers [in the event that the House and Senate accept different
slates of presidential electors from the same state]. At this point, a genuine constitutional
crisis might have arisen. It is not clear how it would have been settled."); Elana Cunningham
Wills, Constitutional Crisis: Can the Governor (or Other State Officeholder) Be Removed from
Office in a Court Action after Being Convicted ofa Felony?, 50 AMK. L. REV. 221, 225 (1997) ("It
was this state of affairs that lead to Arkansas' constitutional crisis. Two individuals claimed
the office of Governor for a brief period....").
32. Linz, supra note 19, at 50 ("Such crises are the result of a lack of efficacy or
effectiveness of successive governments when confronted with serious problems that require
immediate decisions."). Representative Brian Baird has recently suggested the existence of
a constitutional design flaw that could disable the government, the "unlocked cockpit door in
the cabin of the Constitution." Namely, the constitutional specification of elections as the
mechanism for filling midterm vacancies in the House of Representatives may leave the
government disabled if large numbers of congressmen were killed at once. Baird has proposed
that "to make sure the Constitution is strengthened" to eliminate the "potential weakness of
gap" before a constitutional crisis is actually triggered. Ben Pershing, Rep. Baird- Fix
Constitutional "Weakness," ROLL CALL, Oct. 11, 2001; see also H.R.J. Res. 67, 107th Cong.
(2001) (proposing amendment).
33. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[Wlhile the Constitution
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."); Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is danger that... [the Court]
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
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the government's inability to respond adequately to a situation that
seems to demand a response.'
Some have argued that operational crises of both sorts are
intrinsic to the constitutional separation of the executive from the
legislature. In contrast to parliamentary systems, in which govern-
ment authority is essentially unitary and executive leadership
is dependent on the continued confidence of the legislature,
presidential systems empower the executive and the legislature to
act independently of one another and potentially to refuse to
coordinate their actions.35 Given the fixed term of presidential office
and independent electoral mandate, it is possible that a president
"can survive alongside hostile legislatures, leading to stalemates
between the executive and the legislative branch.... Under such
conditions, no one can govern." 6 In the description of presidential
systems by the British writer Walter Bagehot, "the legislature is
forced to fight the executive, and the executive is forced to fight the
legislative; and so very likely they contend to the conclusion of their
respective terms."37 By providing no democratic or constitutional
means for resolving this sort of deadlock, such constitutions may be
particularly prone to crises that can only be resolved by breaking
from the constitutional rules, for example by military intervention
or popular uprising, as has been the unhappy experience of a
number of Latin American nations.3" An analogous constitutional
defect within parliamentary systems, however, is the creation of
34. Supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Such crisis situations are necessarily
variable. Constitutions are supposed to incapacitate government in certain ways. For
example, the First Amendment is intended to render Congress incapable of curtailing free
speech, and the separation of powers is supposed to make the president less capable of
engaging in foreign adventurism. Some incapacities maybe unintended, however, and others
may no longer be regarded as tolerable.
35. M.J.C.VILE, CONSTITUIONALISMAND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 104(2nd ed. 1998);
Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, J. OF DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at
39,44-45.
36. Przeworski et al., supra note 35, at 45.
37. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSITUTION, AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAYS 87
(New York, D. Appleton 1877).
38. Juan J. Linz, The Perils ofPresidentialism, J. OF DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 52-54,
62-64; Przeworski et al., supra note 35, at 44-46; see also Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach,
Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism, versus
Presidentialism, 46 WORLD POL. 1 (1993) (describing executive-legislative conflict in
democracies).
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legislatures incapable of successfully forming a stable government. 9
The constitution of the French Fourth Republic suffered such an
operational crisis, provoking the threat of a military coup and the
advent of the Fifth Republic under Charles de Gaulle, and similar
political fragmentation fed the collapse of the German Weimar
Republic.4 ° The defect need not be regarded as somehow inherent in
the idealized constitutional design in such cases. Constitutions
cannot be evaluated in the abstract. They exist in relation to a
particular political situation, and fail and threaten to fail only in
interaction with political events. A constitution may, however,
either exacerbate or mitigate the problems of political life.
Such operational failures represent true constitutional crises,
because they represent a failure of the constitution to perform its
central function and appear to require extraconstitutional steps to
overcome that failure.4' The formal mechanisms of constitutional
governance, however, make certain assumptions about the informal
practices and norms of political actors. Political actors often have
control over decisions to exploit constitutional forms to drive the
system into crisis. The constitutional system assumes that actors
will instead generally choose to resolve their disputes within the
existing forms rather than instigate crises.
The federal appointments process is an example of a point at
which there exists formal potential for domestic operational failure.
The textually specified mechanisms for filling executive and judicial
offices would appear to be a "[cionstitutional [sltupidit[y]," a
"constitutional accident waiting to happen," if not for their
appropriate background assumptions about how political actors will
in fact behave in regard to those mechanisms.42 The Constitution
39. Although the debate betweenpresidentialismandparliamentarianismis often framed
in universal terms, it should be noted that a variety of particular constitutional structures are
consistent with these basic political types. Individual crises of constitutional operation are
probably better viewed as the product of specific constitutions than as generic products of the
political types.
40. FINN, supra note 21, at 144-45 (analyzing the collapse of the German Weimar
Republic); PHLIP WILLIAMS, POLrIcs IN POST-WAR FRANCE (1954) (analyzing the collapse of
French Fourth Republic); Roy C. Macridis, Cabinet Instability in the Fourth Republic (1946-
1951), 14 J. OF POL. 643 (1952).
41. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
42. Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIEs, CONSTrTUTIONALTRAGEDIES 15,15 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson
[Vol. 43:20932104
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specifies that the President alone may nominate executive and
judicial officers, but can only appoint those officers with the "Advice
and Consent," or confirmation, of the Senate.' There is no formal
mechanism for resolving a dispute if an intransigent Senate were to
refuse to confirm any of the nominations made by a determined
president. Acting well within their clear constitutional prerogatives,
the President and the Senate can fail to reach agreement on
appointments and leave critical government offices unfilled. There
are some partial remedies in this sort of situation, such as the
continuance of existing personnel until replacements are confirmed
or the redistribution of work to other officers already in place, but
the basic possibility of a stalemate remains." Indeed, variations on
such stalemate scenarios have been played out in American history.
The Reconstruction-era Tenure of Office Act barred the removal of
executive officers until their replacements had been confirmed-an
effort to change the default outcome in the appointments game and
force President Andrew Johnson to nominate individuals more
acceptable to the Republican Senate.' Johnson's impeachment was
provoked by the President's effort to replace the Senate-approved
Secretary of War with his own interim appointment.4 Confirmation
of President Bill Clinton's judicial nominations slowed to a crawl in
the final years of his presidency, leading the President to declare a
"'vacancy crisis'" on the federal bench.4' More prospectively and less
eds., 1998). In his essay of that title, Amaris actually writing about the Electoral College and
the possibility that "[olne day, we will end up with a clear loser President."' Id. at 17. It is
notable that the contributors to this volume did not choose to write about such formal
operational defects in the Constitution as the appointments clause or the lack of a
correspondingremoval clause, or thepresidential structure thatmany scholars ofcomparative
politics regard as a fundamental constitutional design flaw, which is indicative of the fact that
such flaws have generally been informally resolved in the United States.
43. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
44. The Constitution also offers a more global formal remedy to such stalemates in the
form of the impeachment power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7. In a true operational crisis
created by the separation of powers, the legislature has the authority to make the final move
to end the stalemate. Id. Of course, that power is difficult to exercise in practice, and may not
be appropriate to all such situations.
45. Tenure of Office Acts, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582 (1820), amended by ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430
(1867).
46. WHrrrGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 115-23, 141-51
(1999); see also infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
47. Peter Baker, Clinton Says Republicans are 'Threat" to Judiciary; Hill GOP Blamed
for"Intimidation,"Delays, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,1997, at A6. The current administration has
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realistically, some called for the Senate to block all Supreme Court
nominations of what they regarded as an illegitimate presidency
in George W. Bush.' Fairly common American complaints of
legislative gridlock, though overstated, point toward a related
potential source of operational failure created by the constitutional
structure of separation of powers, fixed terms of office, and shared
legislative responsibility. 9
Although indicating how an operational constitutional crisis could
emerge from the design of the formal Constitution, these cases also
suggest how unlikely is a genuine operational crisis. The American
government can sustain quite a bit of operational gridlock without
breaking down. Presidential nominations are often rejected or
delayed by the Senate. Congress and the president often fail to
agree on new policies. What converts such routine disagreements
into an operational crisis is the unwillingness of any of the requisite
actors to compromise or back down, leading to either an operational
failure within the government or the eventual replacement of one or
both of the recalcitrant actors. In practice, political actors generally
reach a compromise before such drastic outcomes occur. The
presidential veto, for example, generally is employed as part of a
bargaining strategy, not as a trump card.50 In any case, the
mundane operation of government is fairly resilient to such high-
level political shocks. The anticipation of a timely, if not rapid,
resolution of such interbranch disagreements postpones the
arrival of an actual crisis. There is no bright line separating a
made similar declarations. Alberto Gonzales, The Crisis in Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
2002, at A18. Politically motivated delays in the confirmation of judicial nominations is
endemic to the modern American political system. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman,
Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998,46 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 190 (2002).
48. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12,2001, at 48; Andrew
Koppelman, Let Seats Go Empty: If Given the Chance, Bush Should Put Off Naming Justices
Until a Second Term, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 18,2000, at 23A.
49. See Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 126-27 (1980)
(analogizing the constitutional separation of powers to a parliamentary inability to form a
government and criticizing "the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate
and administer a balanced program for governing"); James L. Sundquist, The Crisis of
Competence in Our National Government, 95 POL. SCi. Q. 183 (1980) (tracing a crisis of
confidence in the U.S. government to a constitutional structure that prevents the government
from beingn"made to work").
50. See generally CHARLES M. CAMERON, VE=O BARGAINING (2000) (examining use of veto
as bargaining strategy).
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constitutional crisis of the operational sort from the usual standoffs
associated with the separation of powers and political disagreement.
The formal possibility of a crisis lurks behind such routine
disagreements, even if it does not emerge.
It is notable that neither the Clinton impeachment nor the 2000
presidential election raised even such formal possibilities for
constitutional crisis. Unlike the appointments power, for example,
the impeachment power is placed in the sole authority of a single
branch of government.51 The independent actions of the House and
the Senate are conclusive of their respective constitutional
responsibilities. Their actions are complete without the partici-
pation or consent of any other actor.5 2 Moreover, the default outcome
in the case of failure to act is both clear and consistent with
continued governmental operation. The House can impeach, or not.
The Senate can convict, or not. The official in question is either
removed and succeeded, or left in place. Impeachments are fully
anticipated by and provided for in the constitutional structure.3
51. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7.
52. Of course, a successful impeachment and removal, especially of the president, does
require the accession of the impeached official. See id. The president must be willing to
recognize and comply with the congressional decision if a crisis is to be averted. It would be
a crisis of fidelity, rather than of operation, if the president simply denied any congressional
authority to remove him from office, perhaps on the grounds that he was "the people's
president." But it is possible that a president might deny the constitutional authority of
Congress to impeach and remove him from office on these particular grounds. He might deny
that Congress has the sole authority to determine what constitutes high crimes and
misdemeanors and assert a coordinate presidential authority to act on his own independent
constitutional understandings. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 32a (1994) ("[U]nder a model of
coordinate interpretive power, impeachment is not the ultimate trump card .... The
impeachment scenario could be played out a step further. Congress impeaches and convicts;
the President sticks to his guns (figuratively and perhaps literally) and refuses to leave,
claiming that the impeachment is unconstitutional, too."). It is likewise possible that the
Supreme Court might reverse its decision in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), and
claim the authority to resolve such disagreements over the correct interpretation of the
constitutional impeachment power, lending its support to an official's refusal to comply with
an impeachment. But see Paulsen, supra, at 299 ("The more realistic understanding ofNixon
is that the judiciary did purport to exercise authority over Senate impeachment
determinations; it merely exercised that authority in a manner that declined to overturn the
Senate'sjudgment."). If it is accepted that actors other than the two houses of Congress have
a coordinate authority to interpret the impeachment powers, then the possibility of a formal
operational crisis is created.
53. There can, of course, be interpretive disputes regarding the impeachment power and
such questions as who can be impeached and what constitutes impeachable offenses, but the
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Given the enormity of the impeachment power, its actual exercise
may signal a political crisis, but it neither signals nor creates this
form of constitutional crisis. The House and the Senate, operating
completely within their recognized constitutional authority, are
sufficiently empowered to resolve any such political crisis without
resorting to extraconstitutional measures.
The Founders were equally careful in creating the system of
presidential election. The constitutional text clearly details the
procedures by which such elections will be conducted and how a
winner will be determined.54 The system is, of course, not automatic,
nor are its details completely specified in the Constitution. The
constitutional rules governing presidential elections must still be
interpreted and supplemented. But the Constitution also specifies
the final political authorities for legislating the detailed electoral
rules and for determining the electoral victor.55 State electors are
chosen in the manner that state legislatures direct,56 and their
electoral votes are accepted and counted by the House and Senate."
When those electoral votes are not sufficient to determine a winning
candidate, the Constitution designates that the House has the final
authority to select a president from among a specified set of
candidates." Any continuing disagreements about popular vote
counts, electoral irregularities, or competing slates of electors would
be resolved in Congress, and legislative procedures have long been
final authorities for resolving such disputes are well established-the two congressional
chambers in exercising their respective powers.
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
55. Id. The constitutional specification of a final arbiter in this context is, in fact, far
clearer than its specification of an ultimate interpretive authority for most other
constitutional disputes, though the Supreme Court has stepped into the gap and asserted its
own supremacy in most contexts. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (political
questions and separation of powers); Cooperv. Aaro 358 U.S. 1,18 (1958) (equal protection).
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Florida Supreme Court thought the state legislature,
in exercising its constitutional responsibility to set the manner for choosing electors, had
essentially created a statute containing contradictory directives. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1231-34 (Fla.), vacated by Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). If so, then the legislature may have itself created
the possibility of an operational crisis, though the court claimed the power to resolve it. Id.
at 1240.
57. U.S. CONsT. amend. XII.
58. Id.
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in place for so doing.59 Despite any uncertainty leading up to the
final counting of ballots in Congress, and any popular unfamiliarity
with this process, there was never any doubt as to where, when, and
by whom the presidential election would ultimately be concluded.
Formal constitutional authority to provide a final and authoritative
settlement to a presidential election contest was securely lodged in
a single institution,6 the most democratically accountable depart-
ment of the federal government. If the election ever created or
threatened to create a constitutional crisis, it could not have been
an operational crisis arising from the formal architecture of the
Constitution.6'
B. Crises of Constitutional Fidelity
Crises of constitutional fidelity arise when important political
actors threaten to become no longer willing to abide by ex-
isting constitutional arrangements 62 or systematically contradict
59. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). This has led some to argue that the entire electoral dispute was
a political question most properly resolved by Congress. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v.
Hsub and its Disguises: Free Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. RaV. 170,
275-92 (2001). Even laying aside the vagaries of modem political question doctrine, the prior
existence of litigation and judicial intervention in Florida and the evolution of modern voting
rights and equal protection doctrine (with its heightened judicial supervision of elections and
electoral disputes) certainly complicated the Supreme Court's situation.
60. Actually, the single institution charged with counting the presidential votes is not so
clearly unified. The Twelfth Amendment specifies that the President of the Senate, which is
the sitting Vice President of the United States, shall open and count the ballots in the
presence of the House and Senate. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The Constitution is ambiguous
as to the precise relationship between the Vice President's counting of the ballots and the
Congress in whose presence he does the counting. See id. The Constitution does not specify
what procedures might be appropriate to challenge the conclusions of the President of the
Senate. At the time of the 1876 election, for example, the House and the Senate were
controlled by different political parties, raising the specter of a stalemate between the two
chambers in the determination of who won the election. ERIc FONER, RECoNsTRUcTION:
AFMRICA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 575-82 (1988). The gap is filled by 3 U.S.C. § 15, which
details the procedures for making and disposing of objections to the ballots.
61. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CI. L.
REV. 657,677 (2001) ("Whether followingpoliticallycontentious-but legal-procedures would
constitute a constitutional crisis is not obvious....").
62. See, e.g., Symposium, The Prime Time Election, from Courtroom to Newsroom: The
Media and the Legal Resolution of the 2000 Presidential Election, 13 CARDOzo STUD. L. & LIT.
1, 75-76 (2001) (remarks by Sanford Levinson):
IT]he possibility remains not only that the House of Representatives would
select a president, but that it would be done on the basis of a voting rule that
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constitutional proscriptions.' Constitutional efficacy depends on the
willingness of political actors to adhere to constitutional principles
and procedures. Normal legislation seeks to regulate social actors
and is undergirded by enforcement mechanisms located in the
government and external to the social context being regulated. The
sanctioning force of the government underwrites the law. By
contrast, constitutions attempt to regulate the government itself
and cannot rely on any external enforcement mechanism. Sanctions
of violations of constitutional requirements must ultimately come
from within the political system. Given that the government itself
is the repository of effective sanctioning power, the primary sanction
available for a constitutional violation is simply publicity of the
violation, which centrally depends for its effectiveness on the
continued general commitment to the constitutional provisions that
are being violated. There are a variety of means of making such
constitutional commitments credible, such as giving a court
independent of the rest of the government a responsibility for
enforcing the terms of a constitution, but the central dilemma of the
self-executing nature of constitutions is inescapable.64 There is a
perpetual danger that political actors, potentially including judges
or the citizenry, will not remain faithful to the putative consti-
tution.65
would make Vermont the equal of Texas, Montana the equal of California. I
think this is a full-scale constitutional crisis waiting to happen .... I think there
would be justified rioting in the streets ....
63. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INTL L. 83, 83 (1993) ("The United Nations is in the midst of an unusual constitutional
crisis. It was not caused by the Organization's historic ineffectiveness but, rather, by new
expectations that parts of the Organization might be evolving into something far more
effective and powerful than anticipated."); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative
Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 457, 527 (1997) ("The use of omnibus appropriations bills with non-germane riders has
'made a mockery of the President's ability to exercise the veto power' and 'corrupted the
delicate structure of shared powers.' This fundamental shift has created a constitutional
crisis.") (quoting Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto:
A Case for the Item Veto, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 584,613 (1991)).
64. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 14, 17-18; RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM,
CONSTITrTIONALISM, AND DEMoCRAcY 113-14 (1999); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 5-6, 198-99 (1990); Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional
Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 143-48 (1992).
65. The problem is more complicated than can be fully addressed here. It maybe possible,
for example, to compartmentalize and layer constitutional fidelity. It may be possible for
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Constitutional fidelity does not require constitutional perfection.
Constitutions are, to some degree, idealized representations of
the political community.66 Whether through mishap or willfulness,
there are bound to be violations of any moderately constraining
constitution. The mere fact of constitutional violations does not
indicate a crisis of constitutional fidelity.67 Constitutional violations
cannot be routine in a true constitutional system. Regular
constitutional violations suggest the inefficacy of a constitution.
Occasional constitutional violations, subject to recognition and
correction, simply suggest human fallibility. As Madison noted, if
men were angels there would be no need for either government or
constitutions.' But if men were wholly corrupt, or uncommitted
to constitutional values, then mere paper barriers would be
insufficient to prevent political abuses in any case.6 9 Constitutions
assume a genuine commitment to constitutionalism and a large
measure of voluntary compliance.
Crises of fidelity undermine a constitution's ability to achieve its
substantive goals of specifying and advancing a specific set of
political values. Those political values may refer to either the means
or the ends of government power, and a constitution will be equally
concerned with identifying the appropriate means by which political
ends will be pursued and with identifying and prioritizing the ends
themselves.7" Whereas an operational crisis calls into question a
specialized institutions, such as courts, to have greater fidelity to specific substantive
constitutional commitments and for other institutions, such as executive officials, to have a
broader fidelity to a constitution as interpreted by those more specialized institutions.
66. See Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of ConstitutionalAuthority, 55 U.
CH. L. REv. 458,464-67 (1988).
67. I leave aside the difficult question of determining what counts as a constitutional
violation. Interpretive disagreements may lead to disagreements over whether a
constitutional violation has in fact occurred. The important point in that context, however,
is that interpretive disagreement still implies a commitment to interpreting a specific
constitution, and to constitutional fidelity.
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
69. See Guillermo O1Donnell,HorizontalAccountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTAB1rr IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 34-41 (Andreas
Schedler et al. eds., 1999) (describing "delegative" democracies in which nonelectoral
constraints on public power are regarded as an 'unalloyed nuisance").
70. A constitution may specify those ends and means more or less thickly, however.
Compared to many constitutions, the U.S. Constitution is especially thin in defining political
ends and fairly thin in specifying appropriate means.
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constitution's ability to establish political order, a crisis of fidelity
calls into question a constitution's ability to establish a particular
political order. Political actors may well challenge the authority only
of specific constitutional provisions, but they may instead challenge
the authority of a constitution as a whole. Important political actors
may continue to accept the authority of, and express their fidelity to,
a constitution as a whole, while still asserting that particular
constitutional constraints, provisions, or rules are unjust, outdated,
or otherwise unworthy of continued respect and without the
authority to demand fidelity.
Crises of fidelity may be connected to the operational crises
discussed above. The existence of an operational crisis may call into
question the substantive value and legitimacy of a constitution,
resulting in a crisis of fidelity. In a sense, this is what happened to
the Articles of Confederation. Because the Articles provided no
mechanism to force state compliance with national policy and
required unanimous consent of the states to adopt any amendments,
the persistent obstruction of individual states to reform eventually
led nationalists to circumvent and replace the entire constitutional
system with a new one. 1 The inability of a constitution to overcome
a political disagreement and authorize action when action is
evidently needed may lead political actors to lose faith in the
constitution itself, or at least aspects of it, and seek elsewhere the
authority to act. 2 An operational crisis may itself arise from a crisis
of fidelity. If some important social or political actors are effectively
71. For a discussion of the loss of faith in the Articles from Madison's perspective see
LANcE BANNING, THE SAcRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLic 43-75 (1995).
72. This seems to be the central element in Bruce Ackerman's theory of unconventional
constitutional amendments. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998). As with the Founding, Ackerman sees political leaders in Reconstruction and the New
Deal as frustrated by the evident paralysis of the existing constitutional order and its inability
to authorize their preferred political actions. See id. As a result, those actors effectively appeal
over the head of the Constitution's Article V amendment process in order to discard, directly
in the name of the sovereign people who are the foundation of the Constitution's own
authority, the old constitutional provision and institute a new one in its place. See id. An
apparent operational crisis leads to a fidelity crisis that produces a new constitution to which
dominant political actors are willing to give their fidelity. This reconstruction of Ackerman's
theory may be both empirically and normatively plausible, but it would not be able to sustain
his insistence that such transformations are still internal to and authorized by the original
constitutional order. See id. at 85-88.
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operating outside the existing constitutional order, they may disrupt
the normal workings of the system and eventually force others to
abandon the established constitutional order as well.
Crises of fidelity may arise from a variety of other sources as well.
Despite the nominal acceptance of a given constitution, a nation's
commitment to that constitution may not be very deep or wide.
When the base of support for a constitution is not very strong in
the first place, the constitution may well be abandoned when it
becomes inconvenient or when its strongest proponents lose
political influence. For example, Bruce Rutherford has argued that
the Egyptian support for liberal constitutionalism was always
limited to the legal and judicial class, and liberal constitutionalism
has faced crises of fidelity whenever the power of that constituency
has waned."3 Even if a constitution was fully embraced initially,
subsequent political developments may lead to a crisis of fidelity.
New political sensibilities may regard long-accepted constitutional
provisions as substantively unjust, or a relatively stable consti-
tutional structure may come to be regarded as outmoded in a new
social or political environment. Some opponents of slavery, for
example, simply became unwilling to continue to recognize the
authority of a "covenant with death." 4 The actions of the state
governments during the Confederation period increasingly led
James Madison and others to lose faith in the justice and continuing
authority of the Articles. 5 Somewhat differently, the urbanization
of the Columbian population left the national legislature
increasingly malapportioned and unresponsive to popular concerns,
which fed armed rebellion and, eventually, extraconstitutional
revision of the electoral system and political institutions." If a
constitution cannot readily be modified within the bounds of its own
73. Bruce K. Rutherford, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Egypt: Understanding the
Obstacles to Democratic Transition in the Arab World 47-58, 455-59 (1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Yale University Library).
74. WILLIAM M.WIECEK, THE SOURCES OFANSLAVERY CONS'TTUmONALISm IN AMFERICA,
1760-1848, at 228-48 (1977); see also J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of
Our Faith, 65 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1703 (1997).
75. BANNING, supra note 71, at 76-107; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLrICs
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrUTION 35-56 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AmEICAN REPUBuC, 1776-1787, at 391-467 (1969).
76. Daniel L. Nielson & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Constitutional Change in Columbia:
Policy Adjustment Through Institutional Reform, 32 COaMP. POL. STUD. 313, 321-28 (1999).
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procedures to reflect the new political consensus, it may instead
suffer a crisis of fidelity as political actors challenge its legitimacy
and authority.
Unfortunately, the existence of a crisis of constitutional fidelity
can be even more difficult to establish than operational failure.
Political actors are prone to accuse their opponents not simply of
being mistaken or guilty of constitutional violations, but also of
being illegitimate and unfaithful to a constitution. Especially when
the accepted range of reasonable constitutional interpretations is
wide, the distinction between reinterpretation and actual infidelity
can be difficult to pin down, at least within a political system such
as that of the United States where the symbolic authority of the
Constitution is largely unquestioned. Charges of infidelity are likely
to be common, but admissions of infidelity are likely to be few.
It also seems difficult to locate in recent events a serious prospect
of a crisis of fidelity for the U.S. Constitution. In granting Congress
the impeachment power, the Constitution imposes both procedural
and substantive limits on its use. Procedurally, it requires a simple
majority in the House to impeach7 and two-thirds of the senators
present to convict.7' Substantively, the Constitution limits the
grounds on which officials can be impeached 9 and the punishments
that can be imposed upon conviction."0 There is little question that
all major political actors recognized and accepted the procedural
features of the impeachment power, as well as the substantive
limits on the Senate.8 ' Although the outcome of the Senate trial was
never in doubt, and thus the issue was not seriously faced, it also
seems very doubtful that President Clinton would have refused to
leave office or questioned the authority of the Congress to judge the
impeachment charges if convicted. The only real question is whether
the House recognized the substantive limits on its power to
impeach, or whether it simply made one of "various kinds of power
plays during which legal rules may be invoked,8 2 attempting a
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2. cl. 5.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
81. There were some interpretive disagreements on the margins, however. E.g., BRUCE
AcKERmAN, THE CAsE AGANsT LAMEDUCK NMPEAcHMENT (1999).
82. O'Donnell, supra note 69, at 41.
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"kind of coup.""3 Although there can be reasonable disagreement
about whether the majority of the House was correct in its
understanding of impeachable offenses, it does not seem plausible
to claim that the House had reneged on its constitutional obli-
gations.8 4 The House majority not only expressed its commitment to
adhering to the terms of the impeachment clause, but it made a
credible effort to justify its actions under a plausible interpretation
of that clause and refused to pursue some articles of impeachment
in part because of doubts about whether those charges crossed the
threshold of impeachable offenses.&5
The threat of a crisis of constitutional fidelity arising from the
2000 presidential election seems, in retrospect, similarly small. It
is striking that there was some brief questioning of the legitimacy
of an electoral vote winner who was not also a popular vote winner,
despite the clear constitutional rule that only electoral votes matter,
but such public doubts quickly dissipated.86 One of the more
interesting facets of the 2000 presidential election is the failure of
the predicted crisis of fidelity upon the election of a "loser president"
to come to pass.8 ' The public fidelity to the Electoral College appears
83. Ronald Dworkin, A Kind of Coup, N.Y. REv. OFBOOKS, Jan. 14, 1999, at 61.
84. Keith E. Whittington, "High Crimes"After Clinton: Deciding What's Impeachable, 99
POLYREV. 27,30-32 (2000).
85. Id. at 31.
86. See, e.g., Bizarre Occurrences Raise Questions About System: Electoral College Could
Face Fire, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Nov. 9, 2000, at A15, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Individual Publications File; Julian Borger, Race for the White House: Constitution: Voters
Open a Legal Can of Worms: System Left by Founding Fathers Faces a Profound Test, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 9,2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications
File; Todd Cooper & Henry J. Cordes, Electoral College Criticized, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD,
Nov. 9,2000, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications File.
87. Amar, supra note 42, at 15-17; see also Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Dj&
Vu, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 993,1011-14 (2001) (reviewing JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAiNSTDIRECT
ELECTION OFTHE PnEsEDENTs: ADEFFNSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1971); ALExANDERM.
BICKEL,REFOEMAND CONT Y;THE ELECTORALCOLLEGE THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY
SYSTEM (1971); and LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLTrICS OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM (1972)). Although it would be difficult to know just how seriously public
opinion poll respondents take the term "legitimacy," it is worth noting that a solid majority
(fifty-nine percent) of the public regarded George W. Bush as the legitimate president even
though Al Gore received more popular votes. TIME/CNN poll, Nov. 11, 2000, Roper Center,
Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News Library, RPOLL File. Even among the quarter of the
voters who would still question Bush's legitimacy even if he won Florida by a narrow margin,
less than half attributed any of their doubts to the Electoral College system itself, as opposed
to the validity of the vote count, and only a fifth (or five percent of all voters) would base their
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to be more robust than some academic commentators expected.
There obviously has been substantial criticism of how the election
itself was conducted and of how challenges to the election results in
Florida were mounted by the candidates and handled by a variety
of government officials. Such criticism, however, focused more on
how the election was administered than on the constitutional
provisions for a presidential election.
Similarly, there have been serious doubts raised as to whether
various government officials, including the majorities of the Florida
and United States Supreme Courts,' were faithful to their
constitutional responsibilities during the course of the postelection
struggle, though such criticisms do not seem to have permanently
damaged the U.S. Supreme Court.89 Although the Court has come
doubts entirely on the Electoral College system, Pew Research Center poll, Nov. 14, 2000,
Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News Library, RPOLL File. See also Bowman, supra note 5;
James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000, at 3-4
(Jan. 17, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), at http'/csab.wustl.edu/perceived-jegitimacy-
american~political_ institutions.html.
88. Seegenerally HOwARD GfLMAN,THEVoTESTHATCOuNTED (2001). Over sixty percent
of the public had less confidence in the judicial system as a whole after the election
controversy. David S. Broder, Courts Risk Public Image in Election Case, WASH. POST, Dec.
12, 2000, at A35.
89. Gore was quick to accept the U.S. Supreme Court's authority over the election
controversy. David Von Drehle et al., Anxious Moments in the Final Stretch: High Court
Stepped in and Wrote Stirring Finish, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,2001, at Al. Nearly three-quarters
of the public favored Gore's move, ABC/WASH. POST poll, Dec. 14,2000 Public Opinion Online,
LEXIS, News Library RPOLL File; only seventeen percent of the public "[did] not accept" the
Court's decision, CNN/USA TODAY poll, Dec. 18, 2000, Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News
Library RPOLL File; and most simply felt "relieved" by the outcome, CNN/USA TODAY poll,
Dec. 18, 2000, Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News Library, RPOLL File. A majority of the
public favored the Court's intervention in the controversy, fifty-four percent to thirty-nine
percent, CBS/NY TIMES poll, Nov. 29, 2000, Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News Library,
RPOLL File; a majority looked favorably on the Court immediately after the Court's actions,
fifty percent to thirty-one percent, LA TMS poll, Dec. 17, 2000, Public Opinion Online,
LEXIS, News Library, RPOLL File; and within weeks of the Court's actions a large majority
of the public continued to look favorably on the Court, sixty-eight percent to twenty-one
percent, Pew Research Center poll, Jan. 11, 2001, Public Opinion Online, LEXIS, News
Library, RPOLL File. Gallup approval ratings for the Court were largely unchanged after the
Court's actions, at fifty-nine percent approval in January 2001, compared to sixty-two percent
approval in August 2000. Wendy W. Simmons, Election Controversy Apparently Drove
Partisan Wedge Into Attitudes Towards Supreme Court, Gallup News Service, Jan. 16,2001,
available at http-/www.gallup.com/pol/releases/pr010116.asp. Most of the general public
(sixty-two percent), if not legal commentators, credited the Court with decidingBush v. Gore
on the legal merits. Gibson et al., supra note 87, at 9. A potentially more troubling difficulty
for the Court, if it persists, is the partisan polarization of its public support after Bush v. Gore.
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in for criticism for its actions, the claims of constitutional crisis
during the postelection contests were not directed at the judiciary
and quickly faded away after the Court's actions.9" It was widely
and readily accepted that the Court's ruling was authoritative, even
if mistaken, and that Congress had the final authority over the
outcome of the election.9' It seems difficult to imagine that, given
the uncertainty surrounding the correct outcome in Florida, the
congressional authority to resolve the issue in favor of either
candidate would have been rejected as illegitimate. Under any
circumstances, President Clinton would have surrendered power
and the congressionally determined winner of the electoral votes
would have been inaugurated on January 20th. Regardless of the
criticisms of this electoral cycle, the constitutionally specified
electoral process will remain in place and authoritative until altered
by an Article V amendment. No major political actor has challenged
the legitimacy of the constitutional rules for selecting the president,
though some have questioned whether various and contradictory
officials correctly followed those (and derivative) rules in this
particular election. There were sharp disagreements as to what
constitutional fidelity required, as there often are, but little chance
that anyone was going to embrace infidelity as appropriate in this
situation.
It is nonetheless possible that the Constitution did suffer a
substantive crisis of fidelity and that the Supreme Court's
intervention in the postelection dispute both reflects and obscures
that crisis. The Constitution specifically grants the House and the
Senate, seated together, the authority to count the votes of the
presidential electors and determine which candidate has the
majority.9 Although the media cries of constitutional crisis were not
very specific, it is possible such concerns were motivated
particularly by this provision of the Constitution and the role of the
Congress in settling disputes over federal elections. 93 It is possible
Id. at 14-15; Herbert M. Kritzer, Into the Electoral Waters: The Impact of Bush v. Gore on
Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDIcATURE 32 (2001); Simmons,
supra.
90. See supra note 89.
91. See id
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
93. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, c. 1 (stating that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge
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that by its actions the Court obscured an actual crisis of fidelity to
that provision, and indeed it is possible that the Justices themselves
were motivated by either such a perception of developing crisis or
their own lack of fidelity to the constitutional procedures that raised
the prospect of a polarized and narrowly divided partisan federal
legislature declaring the victor in a disputed presidential election.94
This would seem consistent with the general public distrust of
Congress, which appears likely to be shared by at least some of the
Justices.9" It is possible that the Founders' delegation of the power
to monitor and resolve electoral disputes to a democratic body is no
longer accepted as appropriate and authoritative, and is in fact a
dead letter, at least in the case of presidential elections. Indeed, the
trend in more recently democratized nations is toward the
establishment of independent election commissions to administer
elections and determine the results.9" Congress may, in fact, only
serve as a rubber stamp in such situations for decisions that are
more authoritatively rendered elsewhere, such as in the Supreme
Court. It is notable that the Court in this case acted on its own
authority, not on a delegated congressional authority as did the
election commission of 1877."7 Relative- to Congress, the Court
generally has better standing with the American public.9"
Consistent with that general tendency, during the dispute sixty-one
percent of the public said that it would prefer to see the election
of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own members").
94. This may be an underappreciated consequence of the unanticipated development of
political parties in the United States. The drafters of the Constitution did not expect political
parties to form and become the central vehicle for organizing politics in a republican
government, and thus did not foresee that Congress would be structured by partisanship
rather than by free-floating deliberation. RIcHARD HoFsTAn'ER, THE IDEA OFAPARTYSYSTEM
40-73 (1969). Rather than serving as an independent arbiter of presidential elections, a
legislature with a partisan majority choosing the winner of a partisan presidential race is
more likely to appear to be judging its own case.
95. See generally JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MOSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC
ENEMY (1995); Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2001, § 6 (Magazine), at
32. See also Larry D. Drainer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 137-169 (2001).
96. Robert A. Pastor,A Brief History of Electoral Commissions, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE, supra note 69, at 77-80.
97. The Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, opposed the creation of an independent
commission as "an abandonment of the Constitution," though he eventually acceded. FONER,
supra note 60, at 579.
98. Jackie Calmes, Citizens'Faith in National Core Remains Sound, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
2000, at A9.
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controversy resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, compared to only
seventeen percent favoring Congress.9 Such a conclusion can only
be speculative, and given the rarity of such election disputes the
matter may be of little practical importance. Even if such a crisis of
fidelity was developing after the 2000 elections, by the time such an
event recurs this provision of the Constitution may have been
amended, the standing of Congress may have improved, or Congress
may be able, through a variety of devices such as a special election
commission, to act nonetheless on its authority. As this possibility
indicates, a constitution may go out in a crisis of fidelity with either
a whimper of irrelevance or a bang of repudiation. Sensing the
possibility of the latter, the Justices and others may have reached
for the former.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no ready list of constitutional crises in American history,
and I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive inventory of
potential crises here. There are, however, a number of fairly obvious
candidates for inclusion in such a list, and they are worth
considering somewhat more closely. In reviewing a few of these
candidates in this section, I argue that actual constitutional crises
have been exceedingly rare, and perhaps even singular, at the
national level. Ultimately, it is less important how such historical
events are best categorized than what light they might shed on
general workings of constitutionalism. My primary concern in this
section is to examine exactly how these historical events have tested
the constitutional system.
A Secession as a Constitutional Crisis
At least one event in American history clearly amounted to a
constitutional crisis-the secession of eleven states in 1860-1861.
Secession and the subsequent civil war and reunification 'were, of
course, crises in a variety of other senses as well. Secession
potentially threatened the continued existence of the United States
99. Broder, supra note 88, at A35.
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itself, and the war was a substantial social, economic, and political
crisis that had revolutionary implications for the character of the
American nation. The Constitution, as well as the nation, was tested
by these events and was in some ways transformed in the process.'
Challenges and amendments are not constitutional crises. More
important, for present purposes, is the possibility that the
Constitution failed to order important political events during this
period. The Constitution as a whole did not collapse. To an
impressive degree, the Constitution continued to operate in the
North. The United States government was still constituted by the
U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution still prescribed the
foundational rules of the political game. Congress still met; elections
were still held. Even so, a variety of constitutional constraints were
at least stretched, and probably broken, as the government
struggled with the consequences of secession. 0' Constitutional
controversies and "problems" erupted everywhere over the next
decade. 2 The secession crisis was a constitutional crisis in both of
the senses described above.
Perhaps most obviously, secession was a crisis of fidelity, though
of a peculiar sort. In seceding, the southern states declared their
independence from the federal union governed by the U.S.
Constitution and denied the continued authority of the Constitution
over their territories or citizens.0 3 For a substantial portion of the
country, the U.S. Constitution was no longer regarded as politically
authoritative and no longer ordered political activities on the
ground.0 4 The constitutional arrangements that, for example,
specified that a president would be chosen by a majority of the
electoral votes were no longer regarded as acceptable in the
aftermath of the election of 1860,15 and mere amendment was no
100. It may also be said that the Constitution was, in some ways, implicated in these
events. Arthur Bestor, for example, argued that the Civil War was a constitutional crisis
precisely because of the "configurative effects" of the Constitution in producing the Civil War.
Arthur Bestor, The American Civil Waras a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 327,328-
30(1964).
101. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTrrUTnONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1964).
102. Id.
103. MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONsTrruTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO
AmERic CONSTITUTIONALISM 7-17 (1991).
104. Id.
105. See MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD 147 (1998) ("If, from the standpoint of
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longer regarded as adequate to restore Southern fidelity to the
Constitution, especially after the firing on Fort Sumter. 6 The
authority for state secession was, of course, deeply contested at
the time, and obviously rejected entirely by the Lincoln admin-
istration.10 7 But there is no question that secession, whether
understood as a revolutionary natural right of political communities
or a constitutionally reserved right of the states,' sought to
overthrow and replace the existing constitutional arrangements in
the seceding states. °9 Even when claiming that their actions were
not explicit violations of the U.S. Constitution, the secessionists'
reliance on state popular conventions was an appeal to a political
authority more fundamental than that of the Constitution and
acting beyond the terms of the Constitution."0
The secession of the Southern states in 1860-1861 represented a
peculiar sort of crisis of fidelity for the U.S. Constitution, however,
precisely because the secessionists remained so faithful to their own
understanding of the prior constitutional order. Even as they broke
from the old constitutional union, the seceding states formed a new
union under a written constitution that nearly replicated the U.S.
Constitution."' The crisis of fidelity in the South was less with the
text of the U.S. Constitution itself than with the larger polity that
was constituted by that text and the adequacies of constitutional
protections given the political character of that polity." The crisis
of fidelity for the U.S. Constitution in the South was transitional to
the restoration of the South's idealized constitutional order in the
form of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America.
political process, Lincoln's election became what the Constitution 'meant,' many in the South
were unwilling to accept such a meaning.").
106. On efforts to pass a Thirteenth Amendment that would have protected slavery see
HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONsTrTUION 40-47 (1973); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND
AUT'HENTc ACTS: AmEND NG THE U.S. CONSTITUTiON, 1776-1995, at 146-52 (1996).
107. HYBMAN, supra note 106, at 50-64.
108. BRANDON, supra note 105, at 167-99 (discussing constitutional justification for
secession); RANDALL, supra note 101, at 12-24 (same).
109. DEROSA, supra note 103, at 7-17.
110. Id, at 15-37.
111. For a useful analysis of the C.S-.A Constitution see id.
112. Id. at 15-17.
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If secession was a constitutional crisis of fidelity in the South, it
threatened the possibility of a crisis of fidelity in the North. The
reality of secession and subsequent civil war led some to see
fundamental flaws in the Constitution and to doubt its continued
viability. After all, if the object of the Constitution "was to hold the
States of this Union together," then the war demonstrated its
failure." As one prominent commentator put it, the war was a "trial
of the Constitution," and it was by no means evident that the
Constitution would survive the test." When the Constitution "is for
the first time subjected to the test of a severe ordeal, its defects are
becoming manifest."" Sidney George Fisher argued, "If the Union
and the Government cannot be saved out of this terrible shock of
war constitutionally, a Union and a Government must be saved
unconstitutionally."" 6
Despite such doubts, however, such a crisis of fidelity never fully
developed in the North, or at most passed quickly. Elections
continued to be held; Congress and the courts continued to operate.
Foreign observers remained more likely than native ones to
conclude that the "Constitution was dead."" 7 Notably, Lincoln
grounded his own actions in constitutional arguments, denouncing
those who recognize "no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to
maintain the Union.""' Although in his special message to Congress
Lincoln suggested a defense of necessity for his actions after the
firing on Fort Sumter, including most notably the suspension of
habeas corpus, his more fundamental argument was that "all was
believed to be strictly legal"" and consistent with the "war power
of the Government."' After some initial hesitation, arguments were
113. Edwin Lawrence Godkin, The Constitution and Its Defects, 99 N. AM. REV. 117, 123
(1864).
114. SDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da
Capo Press 1972) (1862).
115. Id. at v-vi.
116. Id. at 199.
117. HYMAN, supra note 106, at 105. For discussion of the doubts about the adequacy of the
Constitution in the wake of secession see generally id. at 99-123.
118. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,1861), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRrNGs 600 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) [hereinafter LINCOLN:
SPEECHES].
119. Id. For a discussion of the necessity argument see SOTIRIOsA.- BARBER, ONWHATTHE
CONSTITUTION MEANS 186-96 (1984).
120. Lincoln, supra note 118, at 598.
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quickly developed to demonstrate that "the Constitution was
adequate for conditions of war as well as peace." Before the test
of the Civil War, "the adequacy of the Constitution to the exigencies
of government and the preservation of the Union, ha[d] not hitherto
been exhibited and proved in practice, nor fully asserted and
insisted on by its friends, even in theory."1'2 Americans had been
"unconscious of the sleeping powers of the Constitution." 123 The
rediscovery of those sleeping powers, however, allowed continued
fidelity to the Constitution throughout the war. As the Supreme
Court concluded afterward:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace .... for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which
are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily
proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just
authority.1
24
Secession may also be understood as a constitutional crisis of
operation. The text of the Constitution was silent on the question of
secession, and it provided no clear mechanism for resolving the
contested question of whether and how states could secede from the
Union. To Southern secessionists, continued participation in the
Union was strictly voluntary and the states could simply withdraw
their representatives from the United States government and
declare their independence.2 To lame-duck President James
Buchanan, secession was unconstitutional, but no branch of the
121. HYMAN, supra note 106, at 128; see also id. at 124-40.
122. Timothy Farrar, Adequacy of the Constitution, 21 NEW ENGLANDER 51, 52
(Philadelphia, C. Sherman, Son & Co., Printers 1862).
123. DANIEL AGNEW, OUR NATIONAL CONSTrUTON 11 (1863).
124. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
125. 1 JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 142-49
(New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1881); 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONsTITUTIONAL VIEW OF
THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATEs 477-522 (Philadelphia, National Publishing Co. 1868).
This also raises the interesting possibility of a formal operational crisis under the original
Constitution as the state legislatures could simply refuse to select senators and deny the
Senate a quorum. Alexander Hamilton recognized this formal possibility, but argued that the
staggered terms of the senators and the self-interest of the states made its realization
unlikely. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 364-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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federal government had the power or authority to do anything about
it.'26 By contrast, to his successor, President Abraham Lincoln, the
president had "an imperative duty ... to prevent, if possible, the
consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union" 7 and
a constitutional obligation to take care that the "laws of the Union
be faithfully executed in all the States."2 ' Regardless of which
constitutional understanding of the relationship between the states
and the Union is substantively best, it is clear that those
understandings were sharply contested in 1860-1861 and the
Constitution did not provide adequate means for settling that
controversy. No particular constitutional interpreter could be
regarded as authoritative from the perspective of all the parties in
the dispute. 9
The operational crisis evoked by Southern secession points to an
underlying difficulty of the American constitutional system.
Although the secession crisis was unique, the constitutional
complexity of secession is a problem that is common to a system
grounded in theories of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is
the traditional foundation stone of American constitutionalism, as
evidenced by the use of popular conventions to draft constitutional
texts and some mechanism of popular consultation to ratify them in
the United States.3 0 The idea of popular sovereignty is profoundly
disruptive of the constitutional order, however. A basic feature of
popular sovereignty is its informality, its existence outside of the
normal constitutional forms.' The appeal to the popular sovereign
is the appeal to the "people out-of-doors." 2 But once "out-of-doors,"
the people are also hard to recognize. It is the constitutional forms
126. James Buchanan, Letter to the House of Representatives (Jan. 8, 1961), in 5 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 654, 656-58 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897); James Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message to the Senate and House
of Representatives (Dec. 3, 1860), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra, at 626, 634-36.
127. Lincoln, supra note 118, at 595.
128. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in LINCOLN: SPEECHES,
supra note 118, at 579, 583.
129. Compare a contemporary Canadian case, in which the secession questionwas referred
to the Supreme Court for resolution. Re Secession of Quebec 11998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
130. On state practices see G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITIONS 23-26,
73-75 (1998).
131. See HARRIS, supra note 27, at 201-04.
132. WOOD, supra note 75, at 319.
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of representation that give shape to the people, and yet the ideal of
popular sovereignty recognizes the possibility of an even more
authoritative representation of the people than that embodied in the
institutions of government. The result is a failure of, or a crisis in,
the rule of recognition.'
Any constitutional system grounded in popular sovereignty
risks crisis in determining the authoritative source of law.
Unsurprisingly, Lincoln and the Secessionists disagreed over what
should count as an authoritative expression of the popular will in
1860-1861. The Secessionists appealed to the same device that had
ratified the U.S. Constitution, state popular conventions, as the
appropriate device for declaring their independence from the
Union.n4 Lincoln, in contrast, noted that the Constitution, like every
other "organic law," had no provision "for its own termination," and
therefore the Union could be dissolved only "by some action
not provided for in the instrument itself.""5 He regarded the
Constitution and federal law as still binding and supreme within
the seceding states until he was "in some authoritative manner,
direct[ed] the contrary."3 6 Of course, the seceding states believed
that the President had already received directions in an authori-
tative manner, but Lincoln derided the secession conventions as
merely "some assemblage of men" giving a "farcical pretense of
taking their State out of the Union"" 7 and asserted that "it may well
be questioned whether there is, to-day, a majority of the legally-
qualified voters of any State ... in favor of disunion."3 ' The
conventions and the elections in the South "can scarcely be
considered as demonstrating popular sentiment."39 Such challenges
to any particular representation of the will of the sovereign
people are inescapable."' The Federalist supporters of the U.S.
133. On the rule of recognition see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCPr OF LAW 94-110, 147-54 (2d
ed. 1994).
134. 1 DAVIS, supra note 125, at 70, 208, 220.
135. Lincoln, supra note 128, at 582.
136. Id. at 583.
137. Lincoln, supra note 118, at 603.
138. Id. at 606.
139. Id-
140. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988) 233 (discussing the
"ambiguities of popular sovereignty, its paradoxes and contradictions, especially as embodied
in the mystery of representation"). Lincoln and the secessionists disagreed about the contours
of the sovereign people, as well as about what might count as an authoritative representation
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Constitution were fortunate that the Continental Congress chose to
embrace, rather than resist, their assertion of the authority to speak
in the name of"We the People."' In many subsequent cases, those
holding political power chose to reject, often vigorously and
violently, the claims of the people out-of-doors.'42 The state of Rhode
Island, for example, faced just such a constitutional crisis of
operation when two separate constitutional conventions met in
1841, resulting in two competing state constitutions and eventually
the formation of two competing state governments, each claiming
the constitutional authority to govern and denouncing the other as
treasonous. 3 One response to this problem, as it was particularly
exposed during the Civil War, was the attempted development of an
authoritative legal literature seeking to impose constraints on the
popular sovereign and constitutional conventions,'" countering the
"disorganizing dogma""' of "'political aspirants, party aggressions,
and unscrupulous innovators."
of it. The secessionists adopted the compact view of the Union, in which the people of the
individual states were sovereign. Lincoln adopted the nationalist view, in which the people
of the nation as a whole were sovereign. This disagreement also points to the potential of
federalism to create constitutional crises. Although it is clear that the Constitution and
federal laws made pursuant to it are the supreme law of the land, it is substantially less clear
where the boundaries lie between federal and state authority. As a consequence, itis possible
for the state and federal governments to both claim the same ground and assert their
supremacy over it. Without a generally recognized arbiter to resolve the dispute, federal and
state officials, acting fully within their constitutional authority as they understand it, may
reach deadlock, or potentially armed conflict. The British writer Walter Bagehot thought the
Civil War only exposed "'the sinister influence of the imperium in imperio" inherent in
federalism. HYMAN, supra note 106, at 107 (quotingWALTERBAGEHOT, BAGEHOT'S HISTORICAL
ESSAYS 357 (Norman St. John-Stevas ed., 1966) (1861)).
141. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 34-64 (describing new lawmaking processes and
substantive solutions created by the Founding Federalists, Reconstruction Republicans, and
New Deal Democrats in the name of "We the People").
142. Christian G. Fritz, Legitimating Government: The Ambiguous Legacy of the People's
Sovereignty, 1776-1860 (Sept. 23,2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
143. For accounts of this crisis, see GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORRWAR (1976); ARTHUR
MAY MOWRY, THE DoIR WAR (1901).
144. JOHN A. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (New York, C. Scribner 1867).
145. Id. at 296.
146. HYMAN, supra note 106, at 123 (quoting 3 W. Barry, American Political Science, in
OLD AND NEw 303, 303-04 (1871)).
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B. Reconstruction and the Separation of Powers
Like popular sovereignty and federalism, the constitutional
separation of powers potentially creates ripe ground for operational
crises. One likely candidate for an example of such an operational
crisis emerged just a few years after secession. I do not believe such
a crisis point was in fact reached, but the example of Reconstruction
and the struggle between the Republican Congress and President
Andrew Johnson is instructive nonetheless.
Presidential systems are defined by the separate elections of the
legislature and the head of the government (the president) and by
the fixed term of the president.' The United States is the classic
example of such a system, and indeed is the longest enduring
democratic presidential system in the world.' Although such
systems are often discussed in terms of the separation of powers,
that terminology can be misleading, because the American
Founders, at least, "created a government of separated institutions
sharing powers." " It is the overlap in powers that creates checks
and balances, but this overlap can also create the potential for
operational crises. To the extent that independent institutions or
actors genuinely share power, then the possibility exists that they
will fail to coordinate their actions, resulting in paralysis. Because
presidents hold office independently, and continue to hold office
regardless of the degree of their legislative support, coordination
failures are politically possible. Divided partisan goyernment has
even become endemic in late-twentieth-century United States,
although serious gridlock, let alone an operational crisis, does not
seem to have resulted.150
147. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?,
in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIV PERSPECTIVES 3,6 (Juan J. Linz
& Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994); Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multipartism, and
Democracy: The Difficult Combination, 26 Corn'. POL. STUD. 198,202-03 (1993).
148. Linz, supra note 147, at 5.
149. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960). Neustadtfs point can be
overstated, however, if it is taken to minimizb the distinctions between different political
institutions. For demurrals, see CHARLES 0. JONES, THE PRESIDENCYI A SEPARATED SYSTEM
15-16 (1994); HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTONAL SOUL 115-27 (1991);
JEFFREY K TULis, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 41-45 (1987).
150. MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996) (analyzing modem divided
government); DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN (1991) (concluding that divided
government does not cause legislative gridlock). Partisanship can be a crude measure of
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Lincoln was assassinated mere days after Robert E. Lee
surrendered his army to the United States.5" Lincoln's successor,
Andrew Johnson, was left to deal with the divisive issue of the
appropriate terms of peace. 5 2 Johnson was a "war Democrat" and
U.S. Senator from Tennessee, who chose not to return to his home
state when it seceded in 1861.' After serving as military governor
of Tennessee after it was recaptured by Union troops, Johnson was
asked to be the vice-presidential candidate for the 1864 elections on
the National Union ticket, which was part of Lincoln's general
political strategy of building a bipartisan coalition behind the war
effort. 15 4 Although Johnson regarded secession as mere treason, and
had no fondness for the planter elite who dominated Southern
politics,'55 his goal was "to restore the glorious Union" and bring the
states "to their original relations to the Government of the United
States" as quickly as possible. 56 By the time Congress returned to
session in December 1865, the President was prepared to declare
the South pacified and the Thirteenth Amendment successfully
ratified, and to recognize the newly elected governments and federal
representatives of the Southern states.57
The Republican Congress expected a more extensive social and
political "Reconstruction" of the defeated South and refused to seat
presidential support, however, especially in a system of loosely disciplined parties such as the
United States. DAVID W. BRADY& CRAIGVOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK (1998) (arguing that
gridlock is caused by ideological division rather than partisan division); KEITH KREHBIEL,
PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998) (same); Paul Frymer, Ideological Consensus within Divided Party
Government, 109 POL. ScI. Q. 287 (1994). Moreover, the American two-party system tends to
secure at least a large fraction of the legislative seats for a president's party, even if not an
absolute majority. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RIcHARD G. NIEmi, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN
PoLIcs 198,237-39 (2001). Even after Watergate, the president's party retained thirty-three
percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, and since 1968 the average share of the
House seats held by the president's party has been forty-seven percent. In multiparty
systems, the share of seats held by the presidential party can be much lower. Id.; Mainwaring,
supra note 147, at 214-19.
151. ERic L. McKrnucK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 17-18 (1960).
152. Id. at 1541.
153. WHrITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 113.
154. Id. at 113-14.
155. Id. at 113.
156. Andrew Johnson, Speech of 22d February, 1866, in THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 58 (Edward McPherson
ed., 1871).
157. FONER, supra note 60, at 176-226.
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the Southern delegations. 1S Relations between Congress and the
President quickly degenerated as Johnson vetoed the primary
Reconstruction legislation, attacked congressional leaders as
"laboring to destroy" the Union and the "fundamental principles of
this Government," and encouraged obstruction of Reconstruction in
the South.'59 After a bitter midterm election, in which, for the first
time a president actively campaigned against members of Congress,
Republicans won overpowering support in Congress, leaving the
Democrats with just twenty-five percent of the seats in the House. 6 '
The size of the Republican majorities in Congress insured that
the President would have no control over legislation, leaving
Johnson with an unmatched record of fifteen overridden vetoes.' 6'
In terms of legislation, the constitutional mechanisms operated
without difficulty. Congressional Reconstruction required extensive
administrative capacity, however, and that made it vulnerable to
obstruction from a hostile chief executive. In his conviction that
congressional Reconstruction was contrary to the basic principles of
the Constitution, Johnson tested the limits of presidential
obstruction by using his constitutional powers and executive
discretion to subvert the effects of those policies. The President
ignored congressional test oath requirements in appointing former
Confederates to federal offices and provisional state offices, while
readily extending pardons to former Confederates. 6 ' He ended the
confiscation of the property of former Confederates, which also had
the effect of undercutting the work of the Freedman's Bureau.'
Hitting at congressional policy and Republican Party patronage,
Johnson removed a number of unsupportive federal officials. 64
Proclaiming that peace had been restored to the South, he ordered
the end of military trials of civilians and the release of military
prisoners.165Congress responded in turn by reducing the statutory
delegation of presidential discretion in the implementation of
158. WHrITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 114.
159. Johnson, supra note 156, at 61.
160. See FONER, supra note 60, at 261-71; McKITrlcK, supra note 151, at 421-49.
161. PRESDENTIALVETOEs 1989-1994, at viii-ix (Gregory Harness ed., 1994).
162. MIcHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE ImPEACHmENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREw JOHNSON 39-40
(1973).
163. Id. at 37-38, 41-43.
164. Id. at 46-49.
165. Id. at 44-45.
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Reconstruction, imposing martial law in the South, prohibiting the
transfer of military personnel and requiring that military orders go
through General U. S. Grant, and barring the removal of civilian
executive branch officials without Senate approval of replace-
ments.'66 Efforts to impeach the President finally succeeded in
March 1868, after Johnson defied Congress by attempting to
remove his holdover Secretary of War from office without Senate
approval. 67 In doing so, the President finally gave his enemies
the specific act and arguable abuse of office that could justify
impeachment.6
The battles over Reconstruction demonstrated the relative powers
of the two elected branches of the government and the capacity of a
president to hamper at least certain kinds of congressional policies.
Johnson's vocal opposition to Congress certainly impeded the
progress of Reconstruction, not least by encouraging resistance in
the South.'69 It did not, however, result in a constitutional crisis.
Congress was inexperienced both in engaging in such a huge
political undertaking and in dealing with an antagonistic chief
executive. In a rapidly developing situation, Congress nonetheless
did learn to counter presidential moves and gradually limited the
damage the President could inflict, even prior to the impeachment
that effectively ended presidential resistance to congressional
goals. 7
0
Far from resulting in governmental paralysis, the disagreement
between the two branches did not prevent Reconstruction from
moving forward. There were persistent fears on both sides that
extraconstitutional steps would be taken to end the struggle.
Republicans feared that Johnson would use the military against
them in a presidentially led coup d'etat.7 Johnson in turn feared
that Congress might attempt to suspend him from office, even prior
166. See McKrMRCK, supra note 151, at 473-85; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 121-22.
167. BENEDICT, supra note 162, at 95-125; MCKTRIuCK, supra note 151, at 494-509.
168. For a consideration of the justification for Johnson's impeachment see WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 140-52; Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton
Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. 422, 426-50
(2000).
169. See supra note 158-67 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
171. BENEDICT, supra note 162, at 45.
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to impeachment and trial, and he received assurances from Grant
that the army would prevent that from happening. 17 2 Some of
Johnson's speeches even seemed to suggest the President feared
that Lincoln's fate would be his own as well.' 73 The important point
is that neither eventuality occurred or was seriously contemplated.
Neither side looked outside the Constitution for tools to put an end
to its opponent. Congress employed its legislative powers to hem in
the President, and eventually employed its impeachment power to
attempt to remove him.'74 In finally attempting to remove the
President from office, the Republicans adhered to the constitutional
rules. Not only did Congress not pursue some option other than the
constitutionally prescribed route of impeachment to remove the
President, they waited until Johnson's actions plausibly justified an
impeachment, and they allowed him to serve out his term when he
was acquitted in the Senate.1
75
C. The Progressive State and the Constitution Besieged
In the 1930s, the Constitution, as it was understood by the
Supreme Court, was "besieged."'76 Soon after an overwhelming
reelection, a president whose program was embattled within the
172. WilliamA. Russ, Jr., Was There Danger ofa Second Civil WarDuringReconstruction?,
25 MiSS. VALL. HIS. REV. 39,47-48 (1938).
173. See, ag., Johnson, supra note 156, at 61 ("Have they not honor and courage enough
to effect the removal of the presidential obstacle otherwise than through the hands of the
assassin? I am not afraid of assassins... ").
174. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
175. Richard Nixon was the first president since 1848 to be elected to office with the
opposition party still controlling both chambers of Congress. WHrrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 160. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the administration quickly
looked for ways of advancing its agenda without having to rely on Congress. Id. As Chief of
Staff H.R. Haldeman explained the administration's thinking, "I don't think Congress is
supposed to work with the White House-it is a different organization, and under the
Constitution I don't think we should expect agreement.' STANLEY I. KuTLER, THE WARS OF
WATERGATE 128 (1990) (quoting H.R. Haldeman); see also RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 1-56 (1983). In seeking out alternative courses of action, the
administration took prior developments in the presidency to new heights, and in a new
context. Congress and the courts responded by hemming in presidential discretion.
WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 168-206. As in the case of
Johnson, the Nixon episode led to substantial constitutional conflict, and eventually to
constitutional change, but not to crisis. See generally id. at 158-206.
176. HOwARD GHLmAN, THE CONSTIrUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMSE OFLOCHVER
ERA POLICE PowERs JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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judiciary proposed an unprecedented "reform" of the courts that
would have the effect of giving the administration a voting majority
on the Supreme Court. Amidst popular and congressional outcry,
but also substantial support, the plan was eventually defeated. In
the midst of the controversy, however, the Court decisively reversed
course and gave its approval to the expansive use of government
power to manage economic activity. The result was a "constitutional
revolution."77
The conflict between President Franklin Roosevelt and the
Supreme Court over the New Deal may be another likely candidate
for an American constitutional crisis." s At an operational level,
the Supreme Court's then-unprecedented rate of nullification of
federal statutes-including statutes that were at the center of the
President's legislative program-could be regarded as threatening
governmental paralysis in the face of economic crisis. The standoff
certainly pitted two of the three branches of the federal government
against one another" 9 on fundamental issues and with no clear
mechanism for overcoming the impasse short of concession by
one side or the other. The structure of American judicial review,
however, tends to minimize the degree of paralysis created by such
judicial opposition to the initiatives of the other two branches.
Compared to a system of abstract constitutional review, in which
the constitutional court often becomes in effect an additional
legislative chamber that must be satisfied before a proposal can
become law,8 ° American judicial review is fairly slow and uncertain
in its exercise. The government often can act before the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of those
actions, and even a negative judicial decision may simply start an
interbranch dialogue of revision and reconsideration that may
177. EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
178. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative
Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 24,33 (2001) (describing"the constitutional
crisis of 1937"); Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the
Prisoners' Dilemma within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1196 n.93 (2001) (discussing -the
constitutional crisis in the 1930s and the dramatic post-1937 withdrawal'") (quoting Daniel
J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 64).
179. Or, one branch against the other two, as the Court was invalidating the policies
adopted by both Congress and the President.
180. See, e.g., ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POUIcs IN FRANCE 209-21 (1992).
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extend over years or decades.18' Rather than shutting the
government down, a hostile judiciary may simply force the govern-
ment to adjust. The structure of judicial review is more likely to
shackle government than paralyze it. The New Deal case itself is
indicative of this tendency. In the first decades of the twentieth
century, the Court was not a monolithic obstacle to progressive
reform. It accepted some controversial policies even as it rejected
others."8 2 Even in the context of the administration's first term and
in cases in which the Court did reject the administration's
handiwork, the obstacles that the Court raised apparently were not
insurmountable, given a bit more legislative care than was often
demonstrated during the rush of the first Hundred Days.8 3 Even
one of the most visible judicial defeats for the President, the
invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act, came only
after the Act had been in operation for several years-long enough
to show itself to be a political and policy embarrassment that likely
would have been discarded in any case.18 Though the holdover
independent judiciary hampered the new Democratic majority,'85 it
could hardly freeze the government.
Regardless of the actual effects of the Court's actions, Roosevelt
clearly perceived the Court to be a threat to his goals and took
unprecedented steps to break the impasse. The call for emergency
181. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITTIONAL VALUES 149-50 (1996) (stating that
judicial decisions help to fuel ongoing constitutional decision making that is also shaped by
nonjudicial forces); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTIIONAL DIALOGuES 231-74 (1988) (arguing that
courts are engaged in a "continuing [constitutional] colloquy" with political institutions and
society at large).
182. See generally BARRY CuSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998) (detailing
the complexity of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence in the 1920s and 1930s); see also
Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv.
294 (1913).
183. CUSHMAN, supra note 182, at 34-40.
184. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). On the failure of
the National RecoveryAdministration (NRA), an administration designed to regulate business
pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act, see ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND
THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 19-146 (1966). In particular, Hawley notes: "By the time the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Schechter case in late May 1935, the NRA
had already lost most of its popularity and support.... The whole thing, Roosevelt confided
to Francis Perkins, had been an 'awful headache.'" Id. at 130.
185. For analysis of such conflicts as being inherent features of the constitutional design
see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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measures to overcome the political deadlock is an expected feature
of a crisis of constitutional operation. When political disputes cannot
be resolved within the constitutional framework, political actors
may look outside that framework for the means to achieve their
desired ends. Although unprecedented, and constitutionally un-
desirable, the Court-packing plan did not exceed the constitutional
powers of the elected branches. Rather than placing the Justices
under arrest, disbanding the Court under military threat, or even
ignoring judicial decisions,'86 the President proposed that Congress
adopt legislation that was well within its textually granted and
historically exercised powers.8 7 Although Roosevelt's proposal to
increase the size of the Court was unusual in having the effect of
allowing him to "pack" it with his own allies, 8 the basic power of
Congress to alter the total number of Justices on the Supreme Court
cannot be questioned.'89 As an exercise of legislative power, the
Jeffersonian repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801'90 and the
elimination of Federalist judges was certainly a constitutionally
closer call than Roosevelt's proposed expansion of the judiciary and
creation of new Democratic judges.'9' Moreover, far from acting on
his own initiative, Roosevelt turned to the normal legislative process
established by the Constitution, with its inherent potential to
frustrate the presidential will. If the Court-packing plan signaled a
constitutional crisis, the crisis did not lie in some dysfunction in the
operation of the Constitution. Rather, the Court-packing plan might
have indicated that the President no longer took constitutional
constraints seriously, that the Constitution was suffering a crisis of
fidelity.
186. Although this last possibility may itself provoke an operational crisis, it is possible
that it should not appropriately be viewed as itself an extraconstitutional step. See, eg.,
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81 (1993).
187. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Presents a Plan for the Reorganization of the
Judicial Branch of the Government (February 5, 1937), in 6 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESS OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 52 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) [hereinafter ROOSEvELTPAPERS].
188. WniiAm E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 114-37 (1995).
189. FELIXFRANKMTER&JAMESM. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OFTHE SUPREME COURT 11-12,
47-52, 72-77 (1928).
190. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, Ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156.
191. On the repeal, see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 36-52 (1971);
WHrlNGTON, CONSTITUrIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 44, 58-59.
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The possibility of a crisis of constitutional fidelity during the
1930s would appear to be a real one. The viability of constitutional
constraints depends upon the willingness of important political
actors to respect them. The economic dislocations associated with
turn-of-the-century industrialization had been putting continuing
pressure on inherited constitutional commitments to limited
government, federalism, and strong property rights, and the onset
of the Great Depression could be expected to test the robustness of
those commitments.'92 The standard narrative of the Supreme Court
backing down in the face of Roosevelt's political attack in 1937 and
subsequently revolutionizing constitutional law so as to accom-
modate the New Deal and the growing state strongly suggests a
crisis of fidelity, as external political pressure triumphed over the
judicial enforcement of constitutional constraints. 93 Although the
President and his supporters may have used constitutionally
provided tools to mount their challenge to the Court, their success
in forcing a judicial retreat might still have meant a substantive
break with the constitutional past and the failure of the oldConstitution. 114
The New Dealers themselves, of course, did not claim to be
abandoning the Constitution or rejecting any of its provisions.
Appearances to the contrary, the New Dealers asserted that they
were in fact saving the Constitution from its supposed caretakers.
One version of this claim held that the New Dealers were simply
recovering the Constitution as John Marshall understood it, and
that it was the Justices of the Lochner Court who had abandoned
constitutional verities and broken from their constitutional faith. 195
192. In 1911, for example, Justice Horace Lurton complained of the "restless tugging
against the bonds of the law and the yoke of the Constitution." Horace H. Lurton, A
Government of Law or a Government of Men?, 193 N. AM. REv. 9,9 (1911). Five years earlier,
Chief Justice Walter Clark of North Carolina had observed that the Constitution was
"reactionary." Walter Clark, Some Defects in the Constitution of the United States, Address
Before the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania (April 27, 1906), in 54 U. PA.
L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 263,265 (1906); see also MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MAcHmE THAT WouLD
Go OF ITSELF 189-216 (1986).
193. See, eg., ROBERTG.MCCLOSKEY,THEAMFCANSUPREMECOURT117-20 (2ded. 1994);
see also CUSHMAN, supra note 182, at 228 nn.8-9 (citing a list of sources).
194. On the different forms of constitutional failure, see BRANDON, supra note 105, at 20-
21.
195. For description and critique of this "myth of recovery," see 1 ACKERMAN, supra note
6, at 42-50.
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In this reading, the New Dealers were more faithful to the
Constitution than were the Justices. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
had been particularly prominent in laying the groundwork for this
claim in his dissent in Lochner, where he denounced the majority for
deciding the case based not on the Constitution but on "an economic
theory" that the Justices happened to support.' If the Justices had
confused their political preferences for the Constitution, then it
could be no constitutional crisis for the administration to force the
Court back onto constitutional grounds, and Roosevelt repeatedly
condemned the Court in just these terms.197 Unfortunately, this
argument is not very plausible. As a burgeoning revisionist
literature has demonstrated, the Court that stood against the New
Deal had been articulating long-standing constitutional principles,
and no invocation of the nationalism of John Marshall would have
been sufficient to sustain the Progressive innovations of the early
twentieth century.9" The Constitution inherited from the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, not runaway judges, created the obstacles
to the New Deal.
If the Constitution was saved from such a crisis of fidelity, it was
saved by the rise of Realist discourse. The Realist embrace of a
"living Constitution" was the rhetorically linked but conceptually
distinct second approach to defending the New Dealers' consti-
tutional fidelity." From a Realist perspective, the New Deal's
difficulty was not so much with judges legislating from the bench as
with judges adhering to a socially antiquated understanding of
196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
197. E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Fireside Chat Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 187.
198. See, e.g., 8 OWEN M. Fiss, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993); GILLMAN, supra note 88, at
61-145; Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty:ARe-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); Alan Jones, Thomas
M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism". A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751
(1967); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST.
970 (1975).
199. See G.EDWARDWHrE,THCONSTITUTIOwANDTHENEwDEAL 198-236 (2000); Howard
Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living
Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 191, 218-40
(1997).
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constitutional requirements.2 ' The problem of constitutional fidelity
can be resolved in either of two ways: by strictly adhering to the
original commitments of the constitutional text or by reinterpreting
those commitments to allow activities that were previously thought
to be proscribed.20 ' The relatively demanding amendment
procedures for the U.S. Constitution called into question, for many,
the Constitution's adaptability to the dramatically changing social
conditions of the turn of the century.0 2 A reconsideration of
constitutional interpretation promised a more flexible and adaptable
Constitution without the necessity of any formal alteration of the
text.
In his Bull Moose incarnation, Theodore Roosevelt declared his
desire to treat "the Constitution as a living force for righteousness"
and "for applying the Constitution to the issues of to-day."203 Such
a Progressive approach to constitutional interpretation was
embraced by President Franklin Roosevelt to help explain his
critique of the Court and the justification for the New Deal. In his
first inaugural address, President Roosevelt proclaimed, "Our
Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to
meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement
without loss of essential form."2 Against the more despairing views
of many of his allies, the President had continued faith in the
adaptability of the Constitution.0 5 In defense of his proposal for
judicial reform, FDR explained that his constitutional studies had
convinced him that the "vital need is not an alteration of our
fundamental law, but an increasingly enlightened view with
reference to it." 06 The text should be given a "liberal interpretation"
so as to be an "instrument of progress."207 A "reinvigorated, liberal-
minded Judiciary"2 ° would "bring to the Courts a present-day sense
200. See infra text accompanying notes 204-10.
201. See WHITE, supra note 199, at 198-236; Gillman, supra note 199, at 218-40.
202. See, e.g., DAVID E. KYviG, EXPIucrrAND AUTHENTIC ACTS 188-94 (1996).
203. Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy, Address Before the Ohio Constitutional
Convention, in 100 THE OUTLOOK 390, 391 (1912).
204. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 ROOSEVELT PAPERS,
supra note 187, at 11, 14-15.
205. KAIMEN, supra note 192, at 259.
206. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 6, 1937), in 5
ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 187, at 634, 639.
207. Id.
208. 6 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 187, at 133.
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of the Constitution."" 9 A crisis of constitutional fidelity could be,
and was, avoided by the simple expedient of determining that "a
present-day sense of the Constitution" could not only sustain the
New Deal but could also be adequate to the political needs of
the twentieth century.210 This expedient could not prevent some
from charging that the New Deal was unfaithful to the original
Constitution.1  It could, however, prevent those charges from
sticking politically and preserve the general belief that consti-
tutional forms and substance were still relevant, vital, and binding.
In urging interpretive flexibility in regard to the Constitution,
Roosevelt was not simply making a cynical ploy. He was drawing on
intellectual trends among legal Progressives that had been building
and deepening over the course of decades and that were well-
accepted within his own brain trust.22
III. AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES
Identifying the varieties of constitutional crises may help us
identify the ways in which constitutional crises are avoided. This is
not to say that a constitutional crisis is necessarily a bad thing, to
be avoided at all costs. Constitutions are only instrumental goods,
a mere "picture of silver" for the "apple of gold," as Abraham Lincoln
put it on the eve of the Civil War.13 It may be perfectly appropriate
to put an unjust or inadequate constitution into crisis in order to
force reform or revolution. At various times in American history,
dissenters from the established political order have seen the
virtue in constitutional crisis. The Federalists thought radical
constitutional reform was inevitable if the American experiment in
democracy and independence was to be sustained.2 14 Both
abolitionists and Southern fire-eaters questioned the value of
continued constitutional union."' The Left at the turn of the century
209. Id. at 127.
210. Id.
211. Gillman, supra note 199, at 224-23.
212. KAMMEN, supra note 192, at 271-78; WHrTE, supra note 199, at 167-236, 269-301;
Gillman, supra note 199, at 224-38.
213. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: The Constitution and the Union (1860 est.), in LINCOLN:
SPEECHES, supra note 118, at 513.
214. See supra note 75.
215. PAuL C. NAGEL, ONE NATION INDnrIsmLE 255-58 (1964).
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doubted that the Constitution was, fit for an industrialized
democracy.2 6 Nonetheless, constitutional crises create their own
problems, and certainly it seems preferable that they at least be
avoidable.
Crises of constitutional fidelity and the rejection of the
substantive commitments of a constitution are largely avoidable if
those commitments are few.2  A constitution that is not very
binding is unlikely to cause political actors to chafe under its
constraints. This also seems consistent with a variety of theories of
constitutional interpretation of our existing Constitution that stress
the essential arbitrariness and impermanence of substantive values
and the relative centrality and stability of procedural values.21
Somewhat differently, the New Dealers were convinced that the
Constitution had been written to be a "layman's document" that
empowered rather than hindered the democratic will.219 To borrow
from John Marshall, if a constitution is to endure for ages to come
and not become an object or cause of crises of human affairs, it
should be written and interpreted broadly.22 ° Such a constitution
may bend rather than break under the pressure of social and
political change, minimizing the costs of maintaining the
constitutional faith.
Such constitutional adaptation comes at a price, however, and
only exchanges one threat to constitutional fidelity for another. To
the extent that an important goal of constitutionalism is the
definition and protection of fundamental political values, a loose
constitution sacrifices that goal. The unwillingness to commit
strongly to a particular set of values deprives a political system of
some of the particular virtues of constitutionalism. In doing so, a
loose constitution may avoid the threat of becoming rigid and
outdated only to succumb to the threat of being unable to protect
216. KAMMEN, supra note 192, at 285-316.
217. A similar point can be made regarding operational crises. Ifconstitutional procedures
and structural features are relatively few or loose, then political actors may, in many cases,
be able to escape operational crises through the exercise of their own authority.
218. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISaUST (1980) (urging judicial review
only on the basis of procedural values).
219. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's
Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6
ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 187, at 359, 362.
220. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819).
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important values or resist momentary political whims.221' By being
insufficiently binding, a loose constitution may tolerate govern-
mental abuses and democratic excesses. Those who would prefer to
see substantive commitments more strongly protected from
government power may challenge the moral authority of such a
constitution, as Madison and other Federalists did when the Articles
of Confederation seemed to impose too few restrictions on local
legislative majorities. 2 The opposing sides of the antebellum
slavery debate illustrated the twin pressures on constitutional
fidelity, as both sides questioned the value of a Constitution that
was perceived to be too accommodating to the other.2 In avoiding
one threat of constitutional infidelity, a loosely fitting constitution
may at the same time minimize the need for explicit constitutional
revision, potentially shifting the responsibility for reflecting on
constitutional commitments from more popular political institutions
to less-accountable decision makers such as judges.2
Even recognizing these concerns, a loose constitution with
relatively thin substantive commitments can still matter to politics
while commanding fidelity.2" Rather than attempting to mark out
firm boundaries on government, a constitution may instead seek
only to identify important values to be realized within the political
system itself. The constitutional system may be substantively
meaningful to the extent that it sustains a common discourse and
tradition. Rather than firmly taking some topics off the political
agenda, a constitution may attempt to place some topics onto the
221. A loose constitution may also encourage defection since a primary mechanism for
sustaining constitutional fidelity is the expectation that others will also be faithful. To the
extent that a constitution is loose, it becomes increasingly difficult to know what"fidelity" will
mean to other actors and thus to know how they will behave politically. See Ordeshook, supra
note 64, at 150.
222. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
224. In comparison to other constitutions, the U.S. Constitution is short, textually broad,
and rarely amended. TARR, supra note 130, at 23-25 (comparing the U.S. Constitution with
U.S. state constitutions); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTrUTIONAL AMENDMENT
246, 247-53 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (same).
225. On one conception of the "thin constitution," see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONsTIUTION AWAY FROM THE COuRTS 9-14 (1999). Tushnet's vision of the Constitution is
substantially thinner than my own, however. See Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's
Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 532-42
(2000).
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political agenda, encouraging political actors to deliberate on and
take account of certain recognized values. Rather than trumping
politics, a substantively rich constitution may engage politics. The
relatively timeless, higher-law dimension of the U.S. Constitution
is particularly prominent, but the American constitutional system
is also dependent on the political construction and reconstruction of
constitutional meaning and values overtime.226 Constitutional faith
is sustained and rejuvenated through politics.
Just as political engagement with the Constitution is essential to
avoiding crises of fidelity, so the informal operation of the consti-
tutional system is crucial to avoiding and defusing potential
operational crises. The Constitution sometimes provides a formal,
final authority for resolving political disputes. In some instances,
such a final authority has been inferred from the constitutional text
to settle disputes over constitutional meaning, as in the case of
judicial review and supremacy. Operational conflicts are often
worked out informally, however, without turning to such final,
formal devices. Of course, informal practices and norms are often
backed by the formal powers that structure the relationship among
political actors. Nonetheless, these informal practices importantly
supplement a formal constitution and should be taken into account.
The obvious presence of operational conflicts that are embedded
in the basic features of a formal constitution can obscure the
informal practices that provide solutions to those conflicts. 27
Political parties, for example, help overcome collective action
problems within Congress and help structure the relationship
between Congress and the President, as well as provide some
continuity of interest in political action and cooperation. Norms of
senatorial courtesy in the presidential selection of local officials and
226. See generally WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29; Keith
E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of
ConstitutionalMeaning, 33 POLITY 365 (2001). Recognizing this broader informal constitution
of norms and values, as well as the formal constitutional text, also requires recognizing the
periodic reconsideration and reconstruction of that informal constitution. Over time, the
effective constitution can therefore be expected to go through many "crises," in the more
neutral sense of turning points. But there is a real danger for the continued success of
constitutionalism in confusing such benign constitutional crises with the more pathological
constitutional crises considered here and usually meant by the term.
227. See Fred W. Riggs, The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional
Practices, 9 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 247 (1988).
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senatorial deference to the presidential selection of high-level
executive officers increase the efficiency with which the government
is staffed and reduce tensions over appointments. Even less
institutionalized is a political culture committed to resolving
conflicts and negotiating compromises to overcome deadlocks. The
backdrop of such shared political understandings can expand the
tolerance of the constitutional system to operational conflicts.
Political actors can exploit constitutional and political institutions
for advantage, relatively secure in the understanding that the
system as a whole is resilient and that conflicts will ultimately be
resolved. Thus, advocates of state nullification of national protective
tariffs could expect their efforts to lead to a negotiated settlement
of the conflicting political demands rather than an operational
stalemate that would subvert the Constitution.2" Though
nullification was innovative and did not invoke any formal process
for overcoming the conflict between claims of national and state
authority,229 state representation in the Senate provided a natural
forum for an interstate compromise. Similarly, the government
shutdown in the midst of the 1995 budget battles reflected
negotiating strategies rather than a failure of constitutional
design. ° The difference between extended political conflict and
actual constitutional crisis turns crucially on the intentions,
expectations, and commitments of the individuals who exercise the
228. The nullifiers may have overestimated the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.
President Jackson regarded nullification as treason and threatened to occupy South Carolina
by military force and hang those who supported nullification. Andrew Jackson, Letters to J.R.
Poinsett, Esq., in THE STATESMANSHIP OF ANDREW JACKSON AS TOLD IN HIS WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES 20, 23 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909). Advocates of secession likewise
underestimated the willingness of the U.S. government to resort to force and sustain an
extended war. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
229. A key theoretical architect of state nullification, John C. Calhoun, did argue that the
constitutional amendment process provided a formal vehicle for arbitrating the dispute
between an individual state and the federal government and a way to "overrule" the state's
constitutional objection and resolve the controversy. E.g., 11 JOHN C. CALHOUN, THE PAPERS
OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 278, 634-36 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1978).
230. Interestingly, I found only twenty-seven references to a constitutional crisis during
the 1995-1996 budget standoff and partial government shutdown, and most of those were
simply quoting statements by House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt and House Ways and
Means Chair Bill Archer. Dow Jones Interactive, Publications Library, All Publications
Database, at http'/Avww.dowjones.com. (last visited June 10, 2001) (search for records
containing "constitutional crisis" and "government shutdown" between the dates of Nov. 1,
1995 and Feb. 28, 1996).
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formal powers established by the Constitution. The very expectation
on the part of political actors that a constitution will survive into
the future helps ensure that a constitution does survive.231 The
expectation that others will adhere to the constitutional rules
dissuades actors mired in political disagreement from quickly
turning to extraconstitutional solutions to their problems. A long
history without military intervention in political disputes encour-
ages all sides to continue discussion and maintain constitutional
forms rather than make a preemptive strike of turning to coercion.
The expectation that there will be future elections encourages
political losers to abide by the results of the current election and
discover "more to gain from continuing to live with the ...
constitutional order than by attempting to upset it." 
2
The American constitutional system is sustained by three key
factors that minimize the threat of crisis. The first is a relatively
good constitutional design. The Constitution is far from perfect, and
some flaws became obvious almost immediately. The Constitution
failed to provide for an explicit means of removing executive
officials, for example, or for adding territories. The unexpected
and undesired formation of political parties created unforeseen
complications for the constitutional design, as did the relatively
greater population growth in the North and Western expansion. 3
231. HARDIn, supra note 64, at 138 ("The long survival of the Constitution and the
government it spawned gives force to the expectations we have that it will continue to survive
and the strength of those expectations is among the chief of the reasons that it probably will
continue to survive."); see also BRANDON, supra note 105, at 164 ("A working constitution,
then, is a kind of trick people play on themselves .... If people believe the Constitution works,
it can (but need not) work."); Ordeshook, supra note 64, at 147 ("If each person believes that
the other will abide by [a constitutional arrangement], both persons will have an incentive to
act accordingly. Thus, their agreement is self-enforcing.").
232. HARDIN, supra note 64, at 137; see also Guillermo O'Donnell, illusions About
Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 34; Przeworski et al., supra note 35, at 43-44. But
see J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23
J. LEGAL STuD. 721, 743 (1994) ("Democracywas on borrowed time, and most Japanese knew
it. For just that reason, rational politicians increasingly adopted endgame tactics."). The
question of whether there is "more to gain" from sticking with the existing constitutional
order than from overturning it is also context dependent. In generally prosperous
circumstances, few could expect to benefit from encouraging, participating in, or tolerating
serious constitutional irregularities or disruptions. In dire economic circumstances, however,
the costs of political instability are substantially reduced and political systems become
unstable. Przeworski et al., supra note 35, at 39-43.
233. See Mark A. Graber, The Civil War as a Constitutional Failure (Sept. 3, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Nonetheless, despite these and other miscalculations, the
constitutional text has proven to be fairly resilient. Such basic
features as the distribution of powers within the national
government and between levels of government have proven to be
generally effective but flexible enough to accommodate political
development. By the standards of both the American state
constitutions and foreign constitutions, the U.S. Constitution is
relatively difficult to amend. 34 Nonetheless, in comparison with
other constitutions the terms of the U.S. Constitution are also fairly
imprecise, allowing for reconsideration, adjustment, and growth
without threatening the integrity of the basic document. The
Founders managed to avoid some of the deficiencies that have
proven fatal to other, similar constitutional texts. In some instances,
the Founders were simply lucky. The coincidence of congressional
and presidential elections, for example, increases the likelihood that
the President will be supported by a large fraction of the elected
legislators, if not an actual majority.' Presidential systems in other
nations have proven particularly brittle when confronted with the
partisan fragmentation of the legislatureY6 In other instances, the
Founders made wise decisions. 37 Given their distrust of executive
power, for example, the Founders created a relatively weak pres-
idency with limited legislative power. An expansive executive decree
authority has been an important source of conflict, stalemate, or
dictatorial transition in presidential systems elsewhere.'
The American constitutional system additionally benefits from a
common and relatively strong constitutional culture. To a striking
degree, political actors in the American system accept the im-
portance of constitutionalism. Disagreements emerge over the
meaning and requirements of constitutionalism, not over the
appropriateness of constitutionalism itself.239 Moreover, even the
234. Lutz, supra note 224, at 257-65.
235. Matthew Soberg Shugart, The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided
Presidential Government, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 327 (1995).
236. Mainwaring, supra note 147; Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz,
Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal, 29 CoMP. PoL. 449, 465-67 (1997);
Przeworski et al., supra note 35, at 44-45; Stepan & Skach, supra note 38passim.
237. Even in some of these instances, however, the Founders benefited from some of the
unintended consequences of their decisions. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
238. Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 236, at 463-65.
239. See, e.g., KAMNEN, supra note 192, at 219-54; SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERIcAN
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historical disagreements over constitutionalism in the United States
have occurred within a relatively narrow range. Constitutional
failures are likely to occur precisely when the constitutional culture
is no longer robust or shared. Mark Brandon has compellingly
argued that the gradual development of two distinct constitutional
cultures in the antebellum United States contributed to the
eventual Civil War.' Though the constitutional cultures in
both the North and the South were derivative of the original U.S.
Constitution and liberal democratic foundings, they were none-
theless increasingly distinct and in tension with one another.241
Somewhat differently, Bruce Rutherford has usefully observed that
the instability of the Egyptian constitutional system is grounded in
the fact that Egypt has not one but multiple, incompatible con-
stitutional traditions.242 In Egypt's case, only one of those
constitutional traditions is liberal democratic, and the three distinct
constitutional traditions are most identified with different political
institutions rather than with different geographic regions of the
country, as was the case in the United States.2" A shared
constitutional culture helps keep political disagreements from
expanding into foundational, constitutional disagreements and
helps provide the common ground upon which political disagree-
ments can be resolved.
The United States also benefits from a relatively limited
polarization in its politics. Constitutions can only do so much. If a
political system is under too much stress, then it is bound to give
way to crisis, regardless of the constitutional arrangements.2"
Keeping political disagreements within constitutional bounds
PoLrics 1-60 (1981).
240. BRANDON, supra note 105, at 139-66.
241. Id
242. Rutherford, supra note 73, at 445-69.
243. Id Similarly, the Latin American nations have inherited a sustained and distinctive
vision of an unencumbered and powerful executive charged with securing the public good that
is at odds with liberal constitutional traditions. BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CoNsTrTUTIoN OF
TYRANNY passim (1993) (describing the historical constitutional foundations of "regimes of
exception" in Spanish America); Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY,
Jan. 1994, at 55.
244. Constitutional arrangements maybe more or less brittle in the face of stress, however.
The United States may be particularly fortunate in its historic socioeconomic circumstances,
because presidential systems may be suited to a somewhat narrower range of environments
than are other political systems. See supra notes 35-38.
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depends on a willingness of political actors to regard the main-
tenance of the constitutional bounds as ultimately more important
than the political disagreement. Just as the important political
actors must be willing to accept the possibility of electoral defeat if
democracy is to prevail, they also must be willing to accept that
some political outcomes are out of bounds if constitutionalism is to
prevail. If the political cleavages within society are too great or
economic conditions too bleak, however, this basic precondition for
constitutional maintenance is unlikely to be met. For some at both
extremes of the slavery debate, it was better to dissolve the Union
and break the constitutional bonds than tolerate the other side of
the debate.245 For leaders in many nations, it is more important to
vindicate national power, advance ethnic or class interests, address
economic difficulties, or the like than to be hampered by con-
stitutional requirements.246 The liberal consensus literature
undoubtedly overstated the degree of consensus and underestimated
the degree of complexity in American politics and history. 47
Nonetheless, the consensus theory was built on the important
observation that politics in the United States have often been less
polarized than politics elsewhere. Part of the Constitution's
survival, as Louis Hartz asserted, undoubtedly derives from the fact
that "fundamental value struggles have not been characteristic of
the United States."24 The Constitution almost certainly benefits
from that relative absence of fundamental political conflict more
than it contributes to it.
Recent events, and the reaction to them, should remind us that
constitutional maintenance is a political concern. It is valuable for
political actors to be reminded that constitutions must in fact be
maintained, and that constitutional stability cannot simply be
assumed. To the extent that appropriate constitutional cultures and
245. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., supra notes 76, 240-43 and accompanying text.
247. For works challenging the liberal consensus narrative see, for example, DANIEL T.
RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS (1987); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS (1997); WOOD, supra
note 75; James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and
Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1987).
248. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 85 (1955). Hartz observes that
when such fundamental value struggles have occurred, the Constitution has been notably
unsuccessful in containing them. Id.; see also id. at 9 (the "removal of high policy to the realm
of adjudication implies prior recognition of the principles to be legally interpreted").
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informal constitutional practices help sustain constitutionalism and
particular constitutions and prevent constitutional crises, then
political actors must take care that such cultures and practices are
maintained and strive in their own actions to adhere to and
reproduce them. Those constitutional foundations are more likely to
be made apparent when political routines have been disrupted and
political presuppositions have been contested.
At the same time, however, it can be damaging to the
constitutional system to panic too easily about the possibility of
crisis. The overuse of such language can lead to at least two
important difficulties. First, it obscures the language itself. If minor
and even not-so-minor political conflicts are labeled as consti-
tutional crises, then we lose the ability to adequately distinguish
real constitutional crises. The full range of constitutional experience
is flattened out and misidentified. The political struggles that are to
be expected within any constitutional system, and that in fact may
be essential aspects of political life under a written constitution,
24 9
may be lost from our constitutional learning. Crying wolf too often
may lead us to fail to recognize and respond appropriately when
true constitutional crises threaten. Equally problematic, however,
we may overreact to the normal complexities and struggles of
political life.
That possibility leads to the second difficulty with the overuse of
the crisis language: Cries of crisis can themselves feed political
and constitutional irregularities. Constitutional crises, and the
threat of constitutional crises, require extraordinary responses from
political actors. If the constitutional order is breaking down, then
the barriers to any given political actor stepping out of the
constitutional order are diminished. Indeed, political actors may
think it necessary to claim new powers and go outside their usual
constitutional authority in order to respond adequately to the extra-
ordinary events that occur when the constitutional mechanisms are
not properly functioning. A constitutional crisis justifies extra-
constitutional, and perhaps even unconstitutional, actions, and a
rhetoric of constitutional crisis can itself lead to a constitutional
crisis.25° It is also notable that the rhetoric of crisis is often used to
249. See WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29.
250. Moreover, to the extent that constitutional stability is grounded in a web of self-
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justify the accumulation of political power, frequently to the
executive.2"' Crisis rhetoric is meant to shorten the patience for
deliberation and the tolerance for dissent and uncertainty. In Latin
America, for example, the declaration of a constitutional crisis has
often paved the way for executive or military leaders to displace
legislatures and lay aside the normal rule of law.s The challenge
to the normal constitutional order is unlikely to be so dramatic in
the United States, but expectation of a constitutional crisis can
nonetheless be problematic. In the case of the American 2000
presidential election, the perceived threat of constitutional crisis
would be particularly likely to favor George Bush. To the extent that
the postelection controversy threatened a constitutional crisis, then
Florida executive officials or legislators, or even the U.S. Supreme
Court, would be amply justified in attempting to bring the
controversy to a rapid close by any means necessary, which would
benefit the early leader in the vote tallies." s Likewise, it justifies
enforcingexpectations, the widespread beliefin impending constitutional crisis and instability
can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If, for example, political actors become convinced that
others are bent on "stealing" an election, then they have every incentive to take extraordinary
steps themselves toward securing victory.
251. TULIS, supra note 149, at 174-81.
252. LOVEMAN, supra note 243, at 11-31; Nielson & Shugart, supra note 76, at 322-28.
253. Less than a month after the Supreme Court put an end to the 2000 presidential
election dispute, Chief Justice Rehnquist pondered the appropriateness of Justices serving
on extrajudicial bodies such as the 1876 election commission. Although noting the dangers of
political acts by members of the judiciary, the Chief Justice mused "the argument on the other
side is that there is a national crisis, and only you can avert it. It may be very hard to say
'no.'" William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of The Chief Justice to the John Carroll Society 16,18
(Jan. 7, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Although noting that the
Democratic justices of the time were furious over the Republicanvictory, Rehnquist concluded
that "Hayes was a better President than some of his detractors predicted, and the nation as
a whole settled down to a more normal existence." Id The country had avoided "a serious
crisis." Id. Justice Scalia made similar remarks in a speech of his own a few months after the
decision. Explaining that the Court's reputation is not "some shiny piece of trophy armor," he
thought it was "working armor and meant to be used and sometimes dented in the service of
the public." Nation, ST. Louis-POST DISPATCH, May 24, 2001, at A12. Justice Kennedy is
reported to have remarked in a meeting with a group of visiting Russian judges in response
to a question about the decision, "Sometimes you have to be responsible and step up to the
plate." The reporter observed that Kennedy "prized order and stability. Chaos was the
enemy." He concluded, "Any imminent constitutional 'crisis' was only in the imagination of
the Justices." David A. Kaplan, The "Accidental President," NEWSWEEK, Sept., 17,2001, at 28.
Of course the Justices were not alone in imagining a constitutional crisis, but the basic claim
that the Justices were responding to fears of a constitutional crisis, and not an actual one, is
plausible. See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Recount Is In, and the Supreme Court Loses, N.Y. TIMES,
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the intervention of actors, such as the state legislature or the
federal courts, who might otherwise not be expected to play a role
in an election contest.2 Unsurprisingly, the dissenting opinion of
the Florida Chief Justice, which was widely regarded as a road map
for U.S. Supreme Court intervention, prominently threatened that
the Florida majority would cause a constitutional crisis.255 A lack of
faith in the capacity of political actors to struggle over and maintain
the constitutional inheritance may well make the Constitution more
fragile, not less.
July 17, 2001, at A19.
A number of commentators have embraced a similar necessity defense of the results in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). E.g., Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The
Florida Fiasco, 19 NEW CRUEMON 4, 6 (2001); Gary C. Leedes, The PresidentialElection Case:
Remembering Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 237 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Florida
2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation,
2000 Sup. CT. R v. 1, 54-55; Sunstein, supra note 31, at 758, 768-69. Such a view of the
Court's role within the American political system would not be unique or uniquely modern.
See Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Constitutional Law, and Political
Questions, 63 J. OF POL. 365 (2001).
254. The fear of constitutional crisis may also lead actors to withdraw from a controversy
that they might otherwise enter. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862
(1992) (referring to the "constitutional crisis of 1937" to justify judicial deference to existing
precedent).
255. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, Bush,
531 U.S. at 98:
I have a deep and abiding concern that the prolonging ofjudicial process in this
counting contest propels this country and this state into an unprecedented and
unnecessary constitutional crisis. I have to conclude that there is a real and
present likelihood that this constitutional crisis will do substantial damage to
our country, our state, and to this Court as an institution.
See also Brief for Petitioners at 14 n.7, Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (No. 00-949) (noting that "Chief
Justice Wells expressed his concern that the majority's prolongation of this counting contest
propels this country and this state into an unprecedented and unnecessary constitutional
crisis."').
